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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
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NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NE Q 3/548/1. (112-133)  
(Part C.)

TITLE: Anglo/Iraqi Political Relations.

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
7 AUGUST 1969.

171  
112

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 46 - 7 AUG 1969 ML 3591 NEQ 3/545/1
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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 721 OF 7 AUGUST RFI SAVING TO  
PARIS THE HAGUE WASHINGTON MOSCOW BEIRUT TEHRAN AND BAHRAIN

ML 3591  
164 MY TELNO 710 (NOT TO ALL): I P C

IT IS FOR OTHERS TO JUDGE WHAT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC  
EFFECTS IN THE GULF AND ELSEWHERE OF A SETTLEMENT OR  
FAILURE TO SETTLE MAY BE. HOWEVER, AS SEEN FROM HERE THE  
FUTURE COMPLEXION AND ALIGNMENT OF THE BAATHIST GOVERNMENT IN  
BAGHDAD - AND HENCE THEIR EXTERNAL BEHAVIOUR - MAY TO  
SOME EXTENT BE AFFECTED BY THE OUTCOME.

2. IF A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT IS REACHED, THE IRAQIS WILL  
BE BETTER ABLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR BALANCING ACT BETWEEN EAST AND  
WEST THAN IF STALEMATE PERSISTS. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAVE  
BEEN CONSISTENT IN SAYING THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE QUOTE  
FALL OUT UNQUOTE FOR THE UK, BOTH IN TERMS OF IMPROVED TRADING  
PROSPECTS AND POLITICAL RELATIONS, IN THE EVENT OF A SETTLEMENT.  
IN VIEW OF THE BAATHISTS' PURCHASE OF BRITISH ARMS IN 1963 I SEE NO  
REASON TO BE TOO SCEPTICAL ABOUT THESE PROTESTATIONS, EVEN  
THOUGH THEY DO NOT IN THEMSELVES JUSTIFY A RECOMMENDATION TO  
IPC TO ATTEMPT A SETTLEMENT. IF ON THE OTHER HAND NO AGREEMENT  
IS REACHED THE BAATHISTS, IN ORDER TO REMAIN IN POWER AND  
SURVIVE, WILL BE DRIVEN TO INCREASE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET  
AND BLOC SUPPORT FOR ARMS, FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNICAL  
ASSISTANCE.

/3. THE

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-2-

3. THE IRAQIS HAVE ALREADY SHOWN CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE LOWER GULF. SHEIKH ZAID'S VISIT (MY TELNO 701) AND TIKRITI'S RETURN VISIT TODAY ARE TIMELY REMINDERS OF THEIR ASPIRATIONS THERE. THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEIR POLICY IS TO QUOTE SUPPORT THE UAR AND NOT TO EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION UNQUOTE. ALTHOUGH THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO PURSUE THEIR POLICY ON TWO LEVELS, THE OVERT AND THE COVERT, THEIR OVERT OFFICIAL POLICY WILL PROBABLY PREDOMINATE FOR THE TIME BEING. IF NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED AND IRAQI DEPENDENCE ON THE RUSSIANS INCREASES, THE GOVERNMENT IN BAGHDAD WILL TEND TO BE MORE REVOLUTIONARY IN CHARACTER, MORE HOSTILE TO THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES AND PERHAPS MORE INCLINED TO QUOTE EXPORT THEIR REVOLUTION UNQUOTE PROBABLY WITH ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE OIL COMPANIES OPERATING IN THE LOWER GULF THAN IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT SATISFACTORY TO THE IRAQIS.

4. IT IS THESE WIDER CONSIDERATIONS WHICH I SUGGEST MIGHT BE PUT TO THE GROUPS (PARTICULARLY BP ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR INTEREST IN A.D.M.A., AS WELL A.D.P.C. AND Q.P.C.) AT BOARD LEVEL. IF ARTHUR COULD ALSO FIND TIME TO SEE HAHN WHO IS NOW IN LONDON, HAHN WILL GIVE HIS OWN IMPRESSIONS OF THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE HE HAS ENCOUNTERED AMONG IRAQI LEADERS.

FCO PASS TO SAVING ADDRESSEES.

MR HAWLEY.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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- 8 AUG 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

*With the compliments of*

**(D. F. Hawley)**

**J. P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.**

**BRITISH EMBASSY**

**BAGHDAD**

**29 July, 1969**

*9.8*  
*Mr. A. K. ... 37.8.*  
*on ...*



**CONFIDENTIAL**

**H of G**  
**1st Sec.**

At Sheikh Zaid's Dinner for President Bakr on 27 July, I asked General Hardan Takriti, at Mr. Hahn's request, if he would see Mr. Hahn in the near future. He promised to do so at 11 a.m. on Wednesday 30 July. However, he found it necessary to ask Mr. Sheikhly, who came by at this moment, whether this arrangement would be alright. Sheikhly immediately said that it would.

2. I asked General Takriti what his present plans were about visiting the U.K. and he reverted to his previous line that he could not go "until he had something in hand". (It is curious that he has apparently dropped any idea of a personal visit to the U.K., unless this reflects some shift of power within the regime. There have been reports of attempts to assail his position as well as the report of the attempt on his life on 18 July.)

(D. F. Hawley)  
29 July 1969

c.c. Mr. J. P. Tripp,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

OIL SENT  
(memoirs)

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Editorial Offices

Minister of State ~~has~~ has not  
seen. N... Eastern... Dept.  
for advice and draft reply  
from ... Mr. Roberts

August 8, 1969.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 AUG 1969 NELQ 3/548/1
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Dear Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 4th August regarding the article on Iraq in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

I am very glad to have the information you have given me about the boundary between Iraq and Iran in the Shatt - al - Arab area and will have the necessary corrections made about the anchorages granted to Iran in front of the ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr.

The author of the section which includes the paragraph on Development is Professor W.B. Fisher of the University of Durham and as the section appears over his signature it will be necessary for me to consult him before making any amendments. I will consult him about this paragraph in the very near future.

You are quite right in assuming that it was for technical reasons that the 1969 printing of the History section contains no reference to the revolution of July 1968 in Iraq. Owing to the length of time taken by the processes of printing and binding these events could not be recorded in the 1969 printing. The History section was, however, revised again for the 1970 printing and an account of the revolution and the events connected with it was then included.

I shall be glad to send you a copy of both the 1970 and 1971 printing of our article IRAQ if you would care to see these. We should be able to include the boundary amendments and any amendments Professor Fisher suggests to the Development paragraph in the 1971 printing.

Yours faithfully,

Christopher Kent

Rt. Hon. Geronwy Roberts, M.P.,  
Minister of State,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London S.W.1.

C.H.W. Kent

Deputy Editor for London





Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

NEQ 3/548/1

12 August, 1969.

DESPATCHED BY  
MASTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

In Mr. Roberts' absence on leave, I am replying to thank you for your letter of 8 August regarding the article on Iraq in the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

I know that Mr. Roberts would be most interested to see a copy of the 1970 and 1971 printing of your article on Iraq in due course.

(K. I. Ferguson)

Asst. Private Secretary to  
Mr. Roberts

Reg's  
K.I.F.  
N/S

C. H. W. Kent, Esq.,  
Encyclopaedia Britannica International Limited.,  
Imperial House,  
15-19 Kingsway,  
London W.C.2.



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DRAFT letter

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To:—

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MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

From *Engum*  
Mr. Roberts  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

C.H.W. Kent, Esq.,

Encyclopaedia Britannica  
International Ltd.,

Imperial House,

15-19 Kingsway, London, W.C. 2.

*In Mr Roberts' absence on leave, I am replying on his behalf to*  
Thank you for your letter of 8 August regarding  
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*I know that Mr Roberts*  
*3/2* would be interested to see a copy of the  
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due course.


*LEF 12/8*

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MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE





Mr. Ferguson



Encyclopaedia Britannica

--- I attach a draft letter which Mr. Roberts may wish to send as a reply to the Deputy Editor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

2. A copy of Mr. Roberts' letter of 4 August and of the

--- reply from the Deputy Editor are also attached.

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
Near Eastern Department  
11 August, 1969



EN CLAIR

F L A S H BAGHDAD TO

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
26 AUGUST 1969

TELNO 761

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP COPY

116

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 27 AUG 1969
NE 3/548/1

DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON.

DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUMMONDED ME URGENTLY AT 1400 HRS GMT ABOUT  
A REPORT RECEIVED FROM THEIR EMBASSY IN LONDON THAT ACCORDING  
TO INFORMATION FROM THE POLICE A DEMONSTRATION WOULD TAKE  
PLACE OUTSIDE THEIR PREMISES THIS EVENING.

DAOUD SAID MINISTRY WERE EXTREMELY ANXIOUS AND ASKED ME  
TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE THAT FULL PROTECTION WAS  
GIVEN TO THEIR EMBASSY AND STAFF.

SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS WERE ORGANISED BY THOSE WHO WISHED TO  
DAMAGE ANGLO IRAQI RELATIONS.

HE WENT ON TO HINT THAT THEY COULD LEAD TO DEMONSTRATIONS  
AGAINST THIS EMBASSY.

2.. I REPLIED THAT I WAS CONFIDENT THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES  
WERE FULLY AWARE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PROTECTION  
OF THE IRAQI EMBASSY AND TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND DAOUD  
OF THE IRAQI'S CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS HERE.

3.. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IF THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN LONDON  
DO ANY DAMAGE WE HERE CAN EXPECT TO SUFFER AT LEAST AS MUCH.  
THE BEST GUARANTEE AGAINST ESCALATING VIOLENCE IS TO ENSURE  
THAT THE DEMONSTRATION IN LONDON TONIGHT IS COMPLETELY PEACEFUL.  
WE ARE TAKING PRECAUTIONS AGAINST REPRISALS.

MR. MCKEARNEY

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*Per M*

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Reference.....

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18 AUG 1969

Neq 3/548/1

Mr. Hinchcliffe

Anglo/Iraqi Relations

alt. The Departmental paper on Anglo/Iraqi relations has been seen by the Secretary of State and has now returned with a number of comments.

2. As to the paper itself, we can now use it for briefing purposes and for the time being it can be considered as a statement of British interests in Iraq and of the future prospects for Anglo/Iraqi relations.

3. The comments by Mr. Hayman, Sir D. Greenhill and Mr. Roberts relate to three main questions which Mr. Hayman has asked the Department to consider. These are:

- (a) British Council activities
- (b) The Soviet involvement in Iraq and the possibility of neutralising or containing it.
- (c) The extent of Western influence, the scope for coordinated Western action and the possibility and desirability of consultation with our Western allies.

4. On (a) Mr. Tripp has sent a minute to Mr. Stewart (CRD) together with a copy of the Departmental paper and a copy of the comments on it. He has asked Mr. Stewart to consider the British Council aspects and to deal with these separately.

5. On (b) I am recommending that Mr. Tripp should send a minute to PUSD asking if an assessment can be made of the nature and extent of Soviet involvement in Iraq. Papers on this subject may already exist.

6. On (c) we must coordinate action here. Mr. Tripp and I agree that the scope for exerting Western influence is very small except through the main Western interest in Iraq - the IPC - and that coordinated action amongst the Western allies is a non-starter. But there may be scope for discussions with the French. I attach a paper which sets out in note form some of the considerations and provides a skeleton for a possible short submission. This will require discussion with Oil Department and Western European Department in particular. Could you pursue this in due course and eventually prepare a draft submission for Mr. Tripp.

Copied to:-

Mr. Tripp

(A.A. Acland)

Near Eastern Department

6 August 1969

Reg. Pa.

Mr. Tripp to Mr. Hayman.

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New see Submission from

MUA

15/8



Covering Confidential

Reference..... with 113

Mr. Brant

Should I tell Mr. Dally that  
General Tikhoni appears to have dropped  
his idea of a visit?

PD

11/8

I told him this morning. He was saying that  
the visit was now off pro tem. (He was inclined  
to read into Tikhoni's Delphic utterance a referen-  
ce to a need for an agreement with IPC  
before he went to the UK. But I do not think  
the wording quite bears this construction). I  
~~was~~ understood that we would keep him  
informed of any subsequent change in position.

Mr. Wallis PD 12/8

NED

14/8

12/8



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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 675

TO BAGHDAD

26 AUGUST 1969

(NEQ 3/548/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 675 OF 26 AUGUST REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN, AMMAN, CAIRO.

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR CALLED ON HAYMAN THIS MORNING TO PROTEST ABOUT A DEMONSTRATION ORGANISED BY THE BOARD OF DEPUTIES OF BRITISH JEWS PLANNED TO TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE IRAQI EMBASSY THIS EVENING, 26 AUGUST. HE SAID THAT THIS DEMONSTRATION WAS AN INTERFERENCE IN IRAQI INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND WARNED THAT IF IT SHOULD GET OUT OF HAND AS DID A SIMILAR DEMONSTRATION LAST JANUARY (SEE MY TELEGRAM 75 OF 29 JANUARY) MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF "SOME OF WHOM HAVE GUNS" WOULD NOT HESITATE TO ACT IN DEFENCE OF THE EMBASSY.

2. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF UNFRIENDLY PRESS COMMENT AND IN PARTICULAR REFERRED TO A LEADER IN TODAY'S TIMES WHICH STATES THAT THE RECENT EXECUTIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT CHRISTIANS AS WELL AS JEWS (NOT TO MENTION MOSLEMS) WERE IN DANGER IN IRAQ. KHALAF REGARDED THIS AS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO INFLAME RELIGIOUS FEELINGS AND AS ADDING A NEW DIMENSION TO THE HOSTILE PRESS CRITICISM ON IRAQI AFFAIRS.

3. HAYMAN SAID THAT THE POLICE WERE ALREADY AWARE OF THE PLANS FOR A DEMONSTRATION AND WERE READY TO COPE WITH IT. WE WOULD HOWEVER CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE HOME OFFICE ABOUT THE PROTECTION OF HIS EMBASSY. WE HAVE NOW EMPHASISED TO THE HOME OFFICE (WITH POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS IN BAGHDAD VERY MUCH IN MIND) THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO PROTECT THE EMBASSY ON THIS OCCASION. THE POLICE WHO ARE EXPECTING A CROWD OF ABOUT 1000 ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY HAVE THE SITUATION IN HAND.

STEWART

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Addressed to

BAGHDAD

telegram No.

675

(date)

26 Aug

~~And to~~

repeated for information to

TEHRAN, AMMAN, CAIRO

~~Saving to~~

Anglo/Iraqi relations.

The Iraqi Ambassador called on ~~Mr~~ Hayman this morning to protest about <sup>a</sup>the demonstration organised by the Board of Deputies of British Jews planned to take place <sup>outside Iraqi Embassy</sup> ~~at Queens Gate~~ this evening, 26 August. He said that this demonstration <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ an interference in Iraqi ~~a~~ internal affairs and warned that if it should get out of hand as did a similar demonstration last January (see my telegram 75 of 29 January) members of his staff "some of whom have guns" would not hesitate to act in defence of the Embassy.

2. The Ambassador also raised the question of unfriendly press comment and in particular referred to a leader in today's Times which states that the recent executions demonstrate that Christians as well as Jews (not to mention Moslems) were in danger in Iraq. Khalaf regarded this as a deliberate attempt to inflame religious feelings and as adding a new

/dimension

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Draft Telegram to:—  
BAGHDAD

No. 675

(Date) 26/8

And to:—

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~~AMMAN~~  
~~CAIRO~~

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26/8/69



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dimension to the hostile press criticism on Iraqi affairs.

3. <sup>Hayman said</sup> ~~The Ambassador was told~~ that the police were already aware of <sup>the plan for a</sup> ~~this~~ demonstration and <sup>were ready</sup> ~~had plans~~ to cope with it. However <sup>however continue to</sup> ~~we~~ would keep in touch with the Home Office <sup>about</sup> ~~on~~ the protection of his Embassy. We have now emphasised to the Home Office (<sup>with</sup> ~~mainly because of the~~ possible repercussions in <sup>very much in mind</sup> Baghdad) that every effort <sup>must</sup> ~~should~~ be made to protect the Embassy on this occasion. The police who are expecting a crowd of about 1000 are confident that they have the situation in hand.

~~AM~~ 26/8

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 762

27 AUGUST 1969

CONFIDENTIAL. (117)

YOUR TELNO 675: ANGLO/IRAQ RELATIONS.

DID THE DEMONSTRATION TAKE PLACE? IF NOT, HAS IT BEEN  
CANCELLED OR POSTPONED? IF THE LATTER PLEASE KEEP ME INFORMED.

ALL IS QUIET HERE AT THE MOMENT.

MR. MCKEARNEY

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
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Mr. Miers

Courtesy Call by the Iraqi Ambassador on  
Mr. Roberts at 3 p.m. on Wednesday 27 August

Your minute of 21 August. There are no particular points that we would wish Mr. Roberts to put to the Iraqi Ambassador.

2. It is possible that Mr. Khalaf may mention the representations made to Ministers on Sunday, 24 August, about the latest Iraqi spy trials and the demonstration outside the Iraqi Embassy (due to take place at 6 p.m. today). He may also refer to recent developments in the Iraqi/Iraq Petroleum Company dispute.

3. We do not think it advisable for Mr. Roberts himself to take the initiative in raising the topic of Iraqi trials and executions with Dr. Khalaf. As all those involved in the trials were Iraqi citizens, we have no official standing in the matter. The executions have now taken place, and the Iraqis will already be very sensitive as a result of the adverse press comment and the demonstration. They know the views of H.M.G. on the subject, and further representations could well lead to the sort of reaction which took place in January (a marked deterioration in relations and demonstrations outside the British Embassy in Baghdad). With the possibility of negotiations with the I.P.C. and in the wider context of Arab/Israel affairs we do not want to be the target of Arab criticism at the present time.

4. On negotiations with I.P.C. there is little to be said. The companies have not yet finally decided their tactics. Mr. Roberts might say that the issues/for the Company to are consider, but we naturally hope that, with flexibility, an agreement might be arrived at satisfactory to all concerned.

5. I attach notes on these two topics.

*A.A. Acland*

(A. A. Acland)  
Near Eastern Dept.  
26 August, 1969

See now tel to  
Baghdad on prints  
raised at meeting  
c.c. Mr. Arthur  
Mr. Hinchcliffe 27/8

*Encl. - pa.*  
*10/11/69*

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Iraqi Trials and Executions

Following the announcement on Baghdad Radio on Sunday 24 August that 15 Iraqis (including Jews and Christians) were to be executed for espionage early on 25 August, Lord Chalfont, in response to a plea from Sir Barnett Janner of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, promised to do what he could to avert the executions.

2. On Sunday evening, a member of the Department telephoned a First Secretary in the Iraqi Embassy and informed him (without further comment) of the representations that had been made to Ministers here. Dr. Khalaf is aware of this and has told Mr. Hayman that such an approach represented an interference in Iraqi internal affairs.

3. If the Iraqi Ambassador raises the subject, Mr. Roberts may wish to say that although the conduct of espionage or other trials involving Iraqi citizens is of course an Iraqi internal affair, the most recent trial has been the subject of representations to British Ministers and it was felt that the attention of the Iraqi Embassy should be drawn to the fact that these representations have been made. It is furthermore a fact that these trials and executions damage the reputation of Iraq in this country, and this we regret since we hope for good relations between our two countries.

4. Dr. Khalaf may also mention recent press comment and in particular the Times leader of 26 August, which he criticizes

/for...

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for bringing the religious element into the question and for commenting that Christians are now becoming involved. Such statements can be countered with the usual line that H.M.G. have no control over the British press. In any case, press comment about Iraq is mild compared with what is said about Britain in the Iraqi press.



Dispute with Iraq Petroleum Company

The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) is a British registered company. The principal shareholders are BP, Shell, Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) and a company owned jointly by Standard Oil New Jersey and Mobil, two of the five U.S. major oil companies.

2. The Iraq Government have since 1961 enacted a series of measures expropriating most of the IPC's concessions area (including a large proved, but unexploited, oil-field, North Rumaila), and giving an active role to the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) in exploiting the expropriated area.

H.M. Government have formally protested against these actions. The IPC has made several abortive attempts to reach a settlement with the Iraq Government, including one in 1965 in which a full-dress agreement was negotiated but never ratified by the Iraqis.

3. In the early part of this year, relations between the IPC and the Iraq authorities were again bad and attempts to re-open a dialogue were once more postponed. In June, however, with the help of friendly elements which included the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sheikhly, an agreement was reached on port and cargo dues at Basra. These had long been a matter of dispute and the company made a generous settlement (more liberal than that proposed in 1965) in the hope that it would lead to wider negotiations.

4. But no sooner was this settlement reached than the Iraqis signed two major agreements with the Soviet Union for

/the development...



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the development of oil resources, including North Rumaila. These appear to make even more remote any possibility there might still have been of the IPC recovering areas outside those which it is at present working. The most for which the company can now hope is proper compensation so that it can preserve its present assets and operations in Iraq in such a way as not to prejudice its shareholders' interests elsewhere, which include British interests even more important than those in Iraq. Even this may not be possible and the company may have to decide whether to accept an unsatisfactory settlement or risk further measures against it. The company's lawyers and our own legal advisers are of the opinion that, in the new situation created by the Iraq-Soviet agreements, the company and H.M. Government should reserve their rights both with the Iraq Government and the Soviet Government. We have drafted notes for discussion with the IPC. The companies, however, are still considering both their long-term aims and their tactical position and are likely to have views over the timing of any protest.

5. Despite the Soviet agreements, the atmosphere in which the IPC is working has paradoxically improved recently and the company has been encouraged by many of the leaders in Iraq to enter negotiations for the settlement of outstanding issues. The only motive uniting both friendly and unfriendly elements in the Iraq Government, however, is their desperate  
/need...

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need for money. On numerous recent occasions members of the Iraq Government have asked the IPC for payment of part of the money claimed by the Iraq Governments, in advance of an overall settlement. It has been suggested that such a payment would ease the way for a solution to be found to the dispute. While the companies do not dispute that, as a result of the settlement, a substantial sum of money would be paid to the Iraq Government (perhaps in the region of £60 to £70 million), they have to consider carefully whether any substantial advance payment would improve prospects of a settlement or merely reduce their bargaining strength. Their minds are not closed to the possibility of an advance payment, but a decision on this must await further exploration of the Iraq Government's position.


6. A settlement of the dispute would therefore be more beneficial to the Iraqis than to the IPC. While IPC policy is uncertain, the company is in essence steering a course between out-right capitulation and standing rigid on its rights. This posture offers Iraq a good opportunity for consolidating its unilateral action whilst opening the way for substantial benefits. There is clearly a political advantage in a settlement between IPC and Iraq which would mitigate the effects of the Soviet agreements; we must, in the end however, count the economic costs both in terms of the balance of payments and the effect of a settlement in Iraq on the oil problems elsewhere in the Middle East. We must also bear in mind that IPC's operations in Iraq are basically a commercial venture and therefore H.M.G. would

/not wish...

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not wish to intervene in the dispute. We are keeping closely in touch with the IPC and expect to hear definitely soon that a delegation will be going to Iraq and to learn something of its aims and powers.

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 678

TO BAGHDAD

27 AUGUST 1969.(E NEQ)

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELNO 678 OF 27 AUGUST REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO TEHRAN, AMMAN, CAIRO.

[26 AUGUST]

YOUR TELNO 781/(NOT TO ALL): DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST IRAQI EMBASSY  
IN LONDON.

BY NOW YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR TELEGRAM NO 675 IN THE EVENT THE  
DEMONSTRATION (IN THE FORM OF A RELIGIOUS SERVICE) PASSED  
OFF PEACEFULLY. ONLY SOME 250 PEOPLE (MOSTLY JEWS BUT INCLUDING  
SOME CHRISTIAN CLERGY FROM THE COUNCIL OF CHRISTIANS AND JEWS)  
ATTENDED. A COLD WET EVENING PROBABLY DETERRED OTHER POTENTIAL  
DEMONSTRATORS.

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION AS YET ON PLANS FOR FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS  
AND ARE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH THE HOME OFFICE.

STEWART

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N.EASTERN D.

ARAB.D.

NEWS D.

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Registry No. **E**  
DEPARTMENT

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date) 27.8.69

Despatched 1217

~~Top Secret~~  
~~Secret~~  
~~Confidential~~  
~~Restricted~~ ✓  
~~Unrestricted~~

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~ } \*  
~~Priority~~  
~~Routine~~

**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

~~En Clair.~~  
~~Code~~  
~~Cypher~~ ✓

[Security classification  
—if any]

[Privacy marking  
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[Codeword—if any]

RECEIVED IN  
~~RESTRICTED~~  
24 AUG 1969

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 678

(Date) 27.8.69

And to: 27/8

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. 678 (date) 27.8.69

And to

repeated for information to TEHRAN AMMAN CAIRO (ROUTINE)

Saving to

Repeat to:—

TEHRAN

AMMAN

CAIRO

Saving to

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 781 OF [26  
AUGUST] (NOT TO ALL) DEMONSTRATIONS  
AGAINST IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON.

BY

BY NOW YOU WILL HAVE SEEN OUR  
TELEGRAM NO 675 [OF 26 AUGUST]

IN THE EVENT THE DEMONSTRATION,  
(IN THE FORM OF A RELIGIOUS  
SERVICE) PASSED OFF PEACEFULLY & ONLY  
SOME 250 PEOPLE (MOSTLY JEWS BUT  
INCLUDING SOME CHRISTIAN CLERGY  
FROM THE COUNCIL OF CHRISTIANS AND JEWS)  
ATTENDED. A COLD WET EVENING &  
PROBABLY DETERRED OTHER WOULD BE POTENTIAL  
DEMONSTRATORS.

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10497  
27/8/69  
NEO  
27/8

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON  
PLANS FOR FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS  
AND ARE KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH THE HOME OFFICE.

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
CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 680

AUGUST 1969 (NED)



CONFIDENTIAL.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 675: [OF 26 AUGUST] ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR PAID A COURTESY CALL (ARRANGED A WEEK AGO) ON MR. ROBERTS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON. BEFORE EMBARKING ON A DISJOINTED TOUR D'HORIZON COVERING THE MIDDLE EAST, HE MENTIONED HOW HELPFUL THE POLICE HAD BEEN IN PREPARING TO COPE WITH MONDAY NIGHT'S DEMONSTRATION OUTSIDE THE IRAQI EMBASSY.

2. KHALAF REITERATED HIS VIEWS ON YESTERDAY'S TIMES LEADER (PARAGRAPH 2 OF OUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE REFERS) AND MENTIONED, ON A PURELY PERSONAL BASIS, THAT HE HOPED MR. ROBERTS COULD SOON TAKE UP HIS STANDING INVITATION TO VISIT IRAQ. MR. ROBERTS REPLIED TO THIS LATTER POINT BY SAYING THAT OF COURSE HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO VISIT BAGHDAD, PROBABLY AS PART OF A GENERAL MIDDLE EAST TOUR SOME TIME IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE.

3. KHALAF MADE NO OTHER POINTS OF GENERAL INTEREST BUT WAS AT SOME PAINS TO POINT OUT THAT AS IRAQ WAS IN THE FOREFRONT OF THE ARAB STRUGGLE HE FELT THAT AS IRAQI AMBASSADOR, HE SHOULD BE CALLED IN TO THE F.C.O. MORE OFTEN SO AS TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF H.M.G.'S THINKING. HE SAID THAT AMBASSADORS OF OTHER LESS IMPORTANT COUNTRIES IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONTEXT (E.G. THE LEBANON) SEEMED TO CALL ON THE F.C.O. MINISTERS MORE FREQUENTLY AND HE ONLY LEARNED OF DEVELOPMENTS AT SECOND HAND. MR. ROBERTS REPLIED THAT KHALAF WAS FREE TO CALL AT ANY TIME IF HE FELT THAT HE NEEDED FIRST HAND INFORMATION ON ANY TOPIC OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

STEWART

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

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~~Confidential~~  
~~Restricted~~  
Unclassified

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~  
~~Priority~~  
Routine ✓

(Date) 28/8

Despatched

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BAGHDAD

Addressed to

telegram No.

(date)

28/8

And to

repeated for information to

Draft Telegram to:—

No. 680

(Date) 28/8

And to:—

Repeat to:—

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Robert (Confidential)

NAD

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Our telegram no. 675 [of 26 August] Anglo/Iraqi  
Relations.

The Iraqi Ambassador paid a courtesy call (arranged  
a week ago) on Mr. Roberts yesterday afternoon.

Before embarking on a <sup>DISJOINTED</sup> tour d'horizon covering the  
Middle East, he mentioned how helpful the police had  
been in preparing to cope with Monday'night's  
demonstration outside the Iraqi Embassy.

2. Khalaf reiterated his views on yesterday's Times  
leader (paragraph 2 of our telegram under reference  
refers) and mentioned, on a purely personal basis,  
that he <sup>HOPED</sup> ~~hoped~~ Mr. Roberts could soon take up his  
standing invitation to visit Iraq. Mr. Roberts replied  
to this latter point, <sup>BY SAYING</sup> that of course he would be  
delighted to visit Baghdad, probably as part of a  
general Middle East tour some time in the not too  
distant future.

13. ...

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27/8/8  
0945/28



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3. Khalilaf made no other points of <sup>General interest</sup> ~~substance~~ but was at some pains to point out that as Iraq was in the forefront of the Arab struggle he <sup>AS AMBASSADOR</sup> ~~felt~~ <sup>IRAQI AMBASSADOR,</sup> that he should be called in to the FCO more often so as to be kept informed of H.M.G.'s thinking. He said that Ambassadors of other less important countries in the Arab/Israel context (e.g. the Lebanon) seemed to call on FCO Ministers more frequently and he only learned of developments at second hand. Mr. Roberts replied that Khalilaf was free to call at any time if he felt that he needed first hand information on any topic of mutual interest.

Handwritten signature/initials

Handwritten signature/initials

26/8

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



Registry No.  
DEPARTMENT

N **E** Q 3/548/1

\* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
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122

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

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~~Secret~~  
Confidential  
~~Restricted~~  
~~Unclassified~~

~~Flash~~  
~~Immediate~~  
~~Priority~~  
Routine

1839  
**CYPHER**

PRIVACY MARKING

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[Security classification  
—if any]

RESTRICTED

~~En Clave~~  
~~Code~~  
Cypher

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[CYPHER]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. 683 (date)

And to CAIRO

repeated for information to TEL AVIV

Saving to

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
-2 SEP 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. 683

(Date) 28/8

And to:—

Cairo

Repeat to:—

Tel Aviv

Saving to:—

Distribution:—  
NEQ Dist.  
NAD  
NEWS DEPT  
ARAB D.

Copies to:—

Jewish Demonstrations in London

We have been informed by the Home Office that the World Union of Jewish students have planned a demonstration to take the form of a "silent vigil" to start in front of the Iraqi Embassy at 1 pm on Friday 29 August.

2. The demonstrators, (expected to be several hundred strong) will then go past the UAR Embassy where they may halt briefly to demonstrate (in an unspecified manner) on their way to the Arab League offices at Hay Hill where they <sup>intend to</sup> plan to hold a second "silent vigil".

3. The police are aware of these plans and are confident that they can cope. We have, on a purely informal basis, told the Iraqi Embassy of the forthcoming demonstration and a police officer is calling on the Embassy to inform the staff at

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28/8/69  
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first hand of the measures that are being taken to protect their building. We have also informed the Home Office.

4. The VAR Embassy were in touch with us on Tuesday about telephone calls they had received threatening VAR government + Commercial property in London. In due course we were able to tell them that the Police had taken appropriate action. After consulting the Home Office we have now <sup>spoken to</sup> ~~contacted~~ the Embassy again, warned them informally about the demonstration & told them that the Police are aware of the position.

C. M. R.

1 spoke to  
St. James, Home Dept  
VIC 6655, x 684

In S. Ahmed  
absent, 1 spoke  
to G. Zafar.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



MID-EAST

STUDENTS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST HANGINGS

SIX JEWISH STUDENTS PARADED IN CHAIN-GANG FASHION OUTSIDE THE IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON, TODAY IN PROTEST AGAINST THE RECENT HANGINGS OF ALLEGED ISRAELI SPIES IN IRAQ AND THE TREATMENT OF JEWS IN EGYPT.

THE DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED FROM THE EMBASSY FOR A SILENT PROTEST OUTSIDE SEVERAL ARAB BUILDINGS, INCLUDING THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC EMBASSY.

-- 1142

Mr Hinchcliffe,

N. Eastern

Dept.

29/8.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 2 SEP 1968
NEQ [redacted] 29/8



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NEQ 3/548/1

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO BAGHDAD

TELNO 684

29 AUGUST 1969

(NEQ)

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO 684 OF 29 AUGUST AND TO CAIRO

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV.

OUR TELEGRAM NO 683. <sup>127</sup>[OF 28 AUGUST]: [JEWISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN LONDON.]

THE DEMONSTRATIONS ATTENDED BY LESS THAN FIFTY PEOPLE PASSED OFF WITHOUT INCIDENT.

STEWART

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

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~~Secret~~  
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Unclassified

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Priority  
~~Secure~~

(Date) 29.8.69

Despatched 1620

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En Clair.  
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—if any]

[Privacy marking  
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. 684 (date) 29 August

And to CAIRO

repeated for information to TELAVIV

Saving to.....

Draft Telegram to:—

X BAGHDAD

No. 684

(Date) 29/8

And to:—

X CAIRO

Repeat to:—

TELAVIV

Saving to:—

OUR TELEGRAM NO 683 [OF 28 AUGUST]  
[JEWISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN LONDON]

THE DEMONSTRATIONS [FORWARD] ATTENDED  
BY LESS THAN FIFTY PEOPLE PASSED  
OFF WITHOUT INCIDENT.

Distribution:—

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NED

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ARAB. D.

NEWS DEPT

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PMH Humble

132W

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29/8

1517/29/82



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SUMMARY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 5 SEP 1969
NEQ 3/548/1

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124

For some time after the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1968 the Iraqis seemed to wish to improve relations with Britain. The Iraqis willingness to resume relations had however been based on their belief that Britain had adopted a new and fairer approach to the Palestine problem. Since January 1969 the Iraqis have become disillusioned with British policies, and it is important that we should not appear to be moving away from our attitude of seeking a peaceful solution based on Resolution 242. (Paragraphs 1 - 9)

The resumption of relations was welcomed by many Iraqis, and trade and cultural links, already strong, were taken up again. Yet the complexes remain and some of the old suspicions of British interference survive. Goodwill exists, though contaminated by these complexes, and could lead to even closer economic and cultural ties. But the advantages Britain enjoys in Iraq will vanish if we appear to favour Israel in the Arab/Israel dispute and to have aligned ourselves completely with the United States. (Paragraphs 10 - 14)

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BAGHDAD.

25 August, 1969.



3/1

Sir,

The Iraqis and the British

"What would I not give to see General Maude riding into Baghdad on a white horse" said an Iraqi with a respectable nationalist record recently. "Sayid Hamed al Jebouri, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, stressed that the CIA, British and Zionist espionage networks were stabbing our army in the back", wrote the Baghdad Observer on the 21st of August. These two statements vividly illustrate the variety in Iraqi attitudes towards Britain. In this despatch I shall try to describe some of these current attitudes and to analyse them.

2. Anglo/Iraqi relations, like Anglo/Egyptian relations, are complicated and at different times each side has been complexed about the other. The Egyptians, right up to 1956, were deeply complexed about the British, but in the immediate aftermath of Suez the boot almost seemed to be on the other foot. In Iraq deep complexes remain, but they have perhaps been compounded in the last year by British attitudes towards the Iraqis which have been so extreme as even to hamper the U.K.'s commercial interest in this country.

3. The British press and television reacted extremely sharply earlier in the year to the hangings in Baghdad, and, though I do not in any way condone what the Iraqis then did, we for our part perhaps forgot the pleasure with which our great grandfathers used to trip down to Tyburn to attend a public hanging little more than a century ago. It was not, however, this apparent sensitivity on

The Right Honourable  
Michael Stewart, M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

/our





our part which upset the Iraqis so much as statements made at the time which they regarded as gross interference in their internal affairs - a feeling shared even by Iraqis who themselves abhorred the public display of bodies. A further deep cause of resentment was the fact that the furore caused by the hanging of Jews far exceeded that aroused over the Moslem and Christian victims. This episode was, of course, intricately connected with the problem of Palestine which is - at least now - at the root of unease in relations between the two countries.

4. In his despatch No. 8 of the 11th of February 1966, Sir Richard Beaumont, when Ambassador here, argued that in the last resort, Britain remained "public enemy no. 1". Since the resumption of diplomatic relations in May 1968 we have had cause to question whether this assessment remained valid. In the first few months after the restoration of relations, the Iraqis seemed keen to give us the benefit of the doubt for having turned over a new leaf. We were spared the press attacks lavished on the U.S. and the West Germans. Ministers and senior officials praised our sponsorship of Resolution No. 242 of November 1967 in the Security Council, and openly said that, although our stance was still not as pro-Arab as they could have wished, we had at least shown understanding of the Arab tragedy and its implications. In other ways too they showed a desire to revert to good relations with a country which subconsciously they still admired and which had in the past influenced so many Iraqis in the cultural, commercial, social and military fields.

5. However, the basis of the resumption of diplomatic relations in Iraqi eyes was a new and fairer approach on our part towards the Arab/Israel confrontation. The Iraqi attitude was similar to the

/Egyptians



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Egyptian as described by H.M. Ambassador in Cairo in his despatch No. 3/6 of the 1st of August. Iraqis have always been hard-liners on Palestine. They never accepted the armistice of 1948 or the cease fire of 1967 and consequently, though initially not openly opposed to a peaceful settlement, they never showed so much enthusiasm as the UAR and Jordan for Resolution No. 242. Nonetheless it was not until January 1969 that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sayid Abdul Karim al Sheikhly, stated publicly that Iraq rejected any solution based on it and even now Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials express more moderation in private conversation. Since January, perhaps by coincidence the very month when Anglo/Iraqi relations reached their nadir since the resumption of relations, there has been a generally increasing tendency for Iraqis to show suspicion of and express disillusion with our Middle East policy and I have come across this attitude even when trying to further the sale of British buses with the Director General of the Baghdad Passenger Transport Service.

6. The Baathist Government in Baghdad have repeatedly and categorically stated that Iraq's foreign relations with other countries will be regulated by the attitude of those countries to Arab problems in general and the Palestine question in particular. They have been remarkably consistent in applying this policy and it accounts for their publicly professed good relations with the USSR and the GDR on the one hand and Falangist Spain on the other. They have practised the same policy in maintaining good relations with France. All these countries are regarded as "friends of the Arabs" on account of their policy and public statements over Palestine. The favourable attitude of the Bloc countries has enabled, or perhaps

/even

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even compelled the Iraqis, who have considerable apprehension of Communism, to develop their relations with these countries and even to lead the field in the recognition of the GDR. Iraq's speedy action against Rumania (my telegrams nos. 743 and 744) for sending an Ambassador to Tel Aviv illustrates the other side of their policy.

7. The U.K.'s policy has latterly appeared to the Iraqis as ambivalent and this impression, combined with a lingering desire to give us the benefit of the doubt, has been responsible for many of the ups and downs in Anglo/Iraqi relations in the last few months. Although by the end of last year there was already a feeling that we had been gradually slipping from our position of neutrality, the general rumpus in the Arab world over reports of our selling tanks to Israel in February aroused all the old Iraqi suspicions of British policy once again. We weathered this storm comparatively quickly and members of the government again began to intimate that they wished for improved relations with the U.K. For instance, at the Queen's Birthday Party on the 14th of June the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sayid Abdul Karim al Sheikhly, specifically said that the presence of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and himself at the Party showed that their policy was to improve relations with the United Kingdom. As recently as the 25th of July General Ammash himself expressed similar hopes for an improvement in relations and appreciation not only of our policy on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute but also of the Arab/Israel problem. Only a short time before a senior government official very close to the Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that the Iraqi government were happy at our "neutral position" in Arab/Israel affairs.





8. I fear, however, that at least some of these expressions of appreciation were based on a misunderstanding of our general position about the supply of arms to Israel and in particular misunderstanding of the Commons debate in July. Since Nasser's speech on the 23rd of July criticising our hypocrisy, the Iraqi press has at all events been following a line very similar to the Egyptians and the Baghdad Observer has for instance described "Britain's policy in the Middle East" as "ambidextrous". President Nasser's meeting in mid-August with President Atassi and various statements made by the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Sayid Babiker Awadallah, suggest that fresh attempts are being made, at least among the Socialist states, to formulate a general Arab policy which would bind governments to order relations with foreign countries according to their attitudes towards the Arab/Israel problem. If we are to maintain even tolerable relations with Iraq and other countries following this policy, it will be increasingly important not to take any action which seems to detract from our announced policy of seeking a peaceful solution based on Resolution No. 242 - particularly as long as the Israelis remain in control of the territory occupied in 1967 and appear to the Arabs more aggressive, expansionist and intransigent than ever.

9. In their relations with IPC the Iraqi government has shown that it is to some extent applying the same cardinal principle of foreign policy. The greatly improved atmosphere between government and Company and the expressed desire of a number of important Iraqi leaders to negotiate a settlement is attributable at least in part to the favourable impression of the Company created by their financing the publication of pamphlets on the plight of the Arab

/refugees





refugees.

10. In the period immediately following the resumption of diplomatic relations our return to Baghdad was - since the central issue of our attitude on Palestine seemed to have been settled reasonably satisfactorily - very widely welcomed by Ministers, government officials and ordinary people, as well as merchants who were keen to re-establish links with their traditional sources of supply. I and the other commercial officers received an exceptionally friendly welcome - to an extent which surprised us - not only from the Private Sector but also from Public Sector organisations and the government departments on which we called. For a time at least the old colonialist enemy seemed to have become the old friend. Iraqis as a whole seemed keen to re-establish the traditionally cordial trading relations as quickly as possible and the results are already apparent in our trade statistics. Iraqis seem to have a more developed penchant for British goods than one could reasonably expect and this penchant extends to other things British as well, including wives of whom there are now some 250. All this prompted the Pakistani Military Attaché to remark recently "I have never seen such suckers for the British as the Iraqis". Immediately after the resumption of relations some Iraqis intimated that they hoped we would exercise greater political influence again and when I paid the first official visit to Basra since the break, all the dignitaries from the Mutasarrif downwards immediately asked when, rather than if, we were going to re-establish the Consulate General. (In fact we are reduced to the possibility of a mere Honorary Consul.) Culturally the resumption of the British Council's activities was looked forward to with great keenness and the Iraqis appear happy now that they are back. Nor has the Iraqi propensity for visiting the U.K. as frequently as possible on leave or duty



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in any way diminished.

11. British goods enjoy an extremely high reputation and British machinery is used in nearly every aspect of Iraq's industrial and rural life. Ruston Engines are widely used for irrigation, Massey Ferguson tractors are a best-seller, and Iraqi Airways operate British aircraft, the newest of which are Tridents. Iraqi Service Uniforms often closely resemble those of the British forces and the armed forces, particularly the Iraqi Air Force, retain great respect for British equipment and training methods. Baghdad has a bus system which has taken much from London Transport and red double-decker buses made by AEC are a familiar feature of the Baghdad streets. On a grey winter day when the gulls are wheeling over the Tigris, one can even be reminded of the Thames as the red buses cross and re-cross the bridges. Cultural contacts too are very strong. A very considerable number of Iraqis have been educated in the United Kingdom and the government still prefer to send their young men to the U.K. for post-graduate degrees. There are approximately 900 there at the present time. Some of the products of this policy now hold high office - for example the Minister of Planning, Dr. Jawad Hashim, who is a London Ph.D and Dr. Salah Sheikhly, the Director General of the Central Bureau of Statistics who holds two English post-graduate degrees. But these are only two of a large number, some of whom have international reputations. Ties in the medical sphere are also extremely strong and many Iraqi doctors hold British qualifications. Amongst older Iraqis, and even some of the younger generation, British methods and British justice are still highly regarded. This leads many of them - not only those who worked with the RAF at Habbaniya - to look back somewhat nostalgically to the days when our influence was greater. Perhaps surprisingly the reputation of the early British

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/administrators





administrators of Iraq remains high amongst the more well-informed and even in the countryside.

12. On the other hand the complexes created during the "colonial" and "royalist" eras remain and some of the old suspicions still haunt us. We are credited with greater power and influence than we now possess and it is perhaps this which makes us the target of the security authorities. Our telephones are tapped and interfered with to an oppressive degree and many Iraqis are prevented from coming to the Embassy, which in any case they are reluctant to do as they retain superstitions about being seen going "to the other side". The Director of the British School of Archaeology was even not granted a permit to dig this season. Petty officialdom can be irritating and it is amongst this class that the strongest anti-British feeling probably exists. However, we are probably not subjected to more onerous administrative delays and procedures than other people and on some occasions officials go out of their way to be helpful simply because one is British.

13. Many Iraqis, as well as some Egyptians, believe that the present government in Baghdad is supported by the U.K. and might have fallen by now had it not been for assistance from the British Intelligence Services. In 1963 the Baathists were, I believe, notably friendly towards the British and many people consider that this situation has been repeated and that the Iraqi attitude is reciprocated. So strong is this impression that a Kurdish friend told me with some heat recently that the previous Ambassador's policy in supporting the Baathist regime was dangerously misguided!

14. Despite a press which is now not infrequently hostile to us and the West and pro-Bloc, there is an enormous reservoir of goodwill

/towards



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towards us in Iraq. Political factors, however, make it difficult as it were to install a pipe of any large diameter to syphon it off and even if we could, we might find the water partially contaminated - by complexes. The most effective ways of tapping the reservoir in the future are through closer economic and cultural ties. If we were to negotiate a government to government loan for the purchase of British goods and at the same time clear up outstanding British claims and also to step up our Technical Assistance programme, our position could be considerably improved. But if our policy and actions over the Arab/Israel dispute give the Iraqis the impression that we are favouring the Israelis - particularly if we were to supply them with significant quantities of arms - then I fear that the considerable advantages, commercial and otherwise, which we have in this country will rapidly vanish. Already neutral observers consider that our coolness towards the Iraqis has pushed them closer to the USSR during the last year. Many of the Baathists now in power in Baghdad would not wish to fall further under the influence of the USSR, but they would turn more in the direction of the East if, having proffered the hand of friendship to the U.K., they felt they had been grossly deceived and that Britain had aligned herself completely with the United States, who are now undoubtedly regarded here as "Public Enemy no. 1".

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jeddah, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tehran and Tel Aviv, and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

*D. F. Harman*

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P.H.

Press Association

MID - EAST

Copy N. A. Dept  
A. Eastern Dept

**IRAQ WARNS BRITAIN AGAINST INTERFERENCE IN LIBYA**

**DAMASCUS, THURSDAY -**

**IRAQ WOULD "VIOLENTLY COUNTER" ANY BRITISH INTERFERENCE IN LIBYA, BAGHDAD RADIO REPORTED TODAY.**

**THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN BAGHDAD WAS SUMMONED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY LAST NIGHT AND ASKED TO TELL HIS GOVERNMENT "IRAQ WILL NOT STAND HANDCUFFED TOWARDS ANY OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN LIBYA." THE RADIO SAID.**

**THE IRAQI MOVED FOLLOWED FEARS EXPRESSED BY THE NEW LIBYAN RULERS YESTERDAY OVER REPORTED ROYALIST EFFORTS TO ENLIST BRITAIN'S HELP TO RETURN DEPOSED KING IDRIS.**

**-- 1223**

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 12  
5 SEP 1969  
NEQ 3/548/1

Ru  
Anglo / Iraqi relations  
PMM  
579



Mr. Acland

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*Mr. Lacey R.E. 119.*  
*Mr. Tripp.*

ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS

Mr. Hawley's despatch analyses the difficulties confronting any significant improvement in Anglo/Iraqi relations.

2. Mr. Hawley recognises the limitations on our manoeuvrability and recommends that we should concentrate our efforts in the cultural and economic fields.

3. We have, as you know, already agreed that there is a good case for asking the British Council to step up their activities in Iraq and the Council is considering what can be done. In the economic sphere we have spent or are spending about £10,000 this year on various forms of technical assistance to Iraq - an increased effort would be difficult to justify (sums have all been earmarked anyhow). I see little point in negotiating a government to government loan for the purchase of British goods until we know whether or not the thread by which the Damoclean sword is supported will snap this autumn.

4. I recommend that the despatch be printed for Whitehall/FCO distribution but not given priority printing.

5. I have prepared a copy for the printers, Mr. Arthur and Mr. Hayman may wish to see the original and there is a spare copy for Mr. Tripp.

6. I do not think that there is any necessity to submit outside the Department on this despatch, anyhow at this stage.

*P.M. Hinchcliffe*

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)  
8 September, 1969

*I agree with these recommendations,  
I have sent a copy to the printers &  
~~submitted~~ one to Mr Arthur & Mr Hayman.  
We shall need to consider what reply*


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*/if any*




if any, should be sent. Perhaps  
a short acknowledgement from me to  
Mr Huxley, covering the despatch to  
the Ba'alt party as well, would be  
sufficient for the moment. Could you  
please draft?

Mr Acland 2/9


in Mr de laiffe I have drafted.   
9/9.

the Mr Evans should see

in Mr Tupper's. An interesting despatch.  
The schizophrenia of the Jewish and British  
policy over the Arab/Israeli dispute makes it  
unlikely that we can exploit the resources of  
good-will described by Mr Gaudin.

  
12.5.

Mr Gaudin. AM 12/1 P.A.

 Mr Acland let's wait

I drafted. Has it come?

AMM 14/9



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124

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NEQ 3/548/1

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IRAQ  
5 September, 1969  
Section 2

## THE IRAQIS AND THE BRITISH

*Mr. Hawley to Mr. Stewart. (Received 5 September)*

### SUMMARY

For some time after the resumption of diplomatic relations in 1968 the Iraqis seemed to wish to improve relations with Britain. The Iraqis' willingness to resume relations had however been based on their belief that Britain had adopted a new and fairer approach to the Palestine problem. Since January 1969 the Iraqis have become disillusioned with British policies, and it is important that we should not appear to be moving away from our attitude of seeking a peaceful solution based on Resolution No. 242. (Paragraphs 1-9.)

The resumption of relations was welcomed by many Iraqis, and trade and cultural links, already strong, were taken up again. Yet the complexes remain and some of the old suspicions of British interference survive. Goodwill exists, though contaminated by these complexes, and could lead to even closer economic and cultural ties. But the advantages Britain enjoys in Iraq will vanish if we appear to favour Israel in the Arab/Israel dispute and to have aligned ourselves completely with the United States. (Paragraphs 10-14.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

*Baghdad,*  
*25 August, 1969.*

"What would I not give to see General Maude riding into Baghdad on a white horse" said an Iraqi with a respectable nationalist record recently. "Sayid Hamed al Jebouri, Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, stressed that the CIA, British and Zionist espionage networks were stabbing our army in the back", wrote the *Baghdad Observer* on the 21st of August. These two statements vividly illustrate the variety in Iraqi attitudes towards Britain. In this despatch I shall try to describe some of these current attitudes and to analyse them.

2. Anglo/Iraqi relations, like Anglo/Egyptian relations, are complicated and at different times each side has been complexed about the other. The Egyptians, right up to 1956, were deeply complexed about the British, but in the immediate aftermath of Suez the boot almost seemed to be on the

other foot. In Iraq deep complexes remain, but they have perhaps been compounded in the last year by British attitudes towards the Iraqis which have been so extreme as even to hamper the United Kingdom's commercial interest in this country.

3. The British Press and television reacted extremely sharply earlier in the year to the hangings in Baghdad, and, though I do not in any way condone what the Iraqis then did, we for our part perhaps forgot the pleasure with which our great grandfathers used to trip down to Tyburn to attend a public hanging little more than a century ago. It was not, however, this apparent sensitivity on our part which upset the Iraqis so much as statements made at the time which they regarded as gross interference in their internal affairs—a feeling shared even by Iraqis who themselves abhorred the public display of bodies.

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A further deep cause of resentment was the fact that the furore caused by the hanging of Jews far exceeded that aroused over the Moslem and Christian victims. This episode was, of course, intricately connected with the problem of Palestine which is—at least now—at the root of unease in relations between the two countries.

4. In his despatch No. 8 of the 11th of February, 1966, Sir Richard Beaumont, when Ambassador here, argued that in the last resort, Britain remained “public enemy No. 1”. Since the resumption of diplomatic relations in May 1968 we have had cause to question whether this assessment remained valid. In the first few months after the restoration of relations the Iraqis seemed keen to give us the benefit of the doubt for having turned over a new leaf. We were spared the Press attacks lavished on the United States and the West Germans. Ministers and senior officials praised our sponsorship of Resolution No. 242 of November 1967 in the Security Council, and openly said that, although our stance was still not as pro-Arab as they could have wished, we had at least shown understanding of the Arab tragedy and its implications. In other ways too they showed a desire to revert to good relations with a country which subconsciously they still admired and which had in the past influenced so many Iraqis in the cultural, commercial, social and military fields.

5. However, the basis of the resumption of diplomatic relations in Iraqi eyes was a new and fairer approach on our part towards the Arab/Israel confrontation. The Iraqi attitude was similar to the Egyptian as described by Her Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo in his despatch No. 3/6 of the 1st of August. Iraqis have always been hard-liners on Palestine. They never accepted the armistice of 1948 or the cease-fire of 1967 and consequently, though initially not openly opposed to a peaceful settlement, they never showed so much enthusiasm as the UAR and Jordan for Resolution No. 242. None the less it was not until January 1969 that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sayid Abdul Karim al

Sheikhly, stated publicly that Iraq rejected any solution based on it and even now Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials express more moderation in private conversation. Since January, perhaps by coincidence the very month when Anglo/Iraqi relations reached their nadir since the resumption of relations, there has been a generally increasing tendency for Iraqis to show suspicion of and express disillusion with our middle East policy and I have come across this attitude even when trying to further the sale of British buses with the Director-General of the Baghdad Passenger Transport Service.

6. The Baathist Government in Baghdad have repeatedly and categorically stated that Iraq's foreign relations with other countries will be regulated by the attitude of those countries to Arab problems in general and the Palestine question in particular. They have been remarkably consistent in applying this policy and it accounts for their publicly professed good relations with the USSR and the GDR on the one hand and Falangist Spain on the other. They have practised the same policy in maintaining good relations with France. All these countries are regarded as “friends of the Arabs” on account of their policy and public statements over Palestine. The favourable attitude of the *bloc* countries has enabled, or perhaps even compelled the Iraqis, who have considerable apprehension of Communism, to develop their relations with these countries and even to lead the field in the recognition of the GDR. Iraq's speedy action against Rumania (my telegrams Nos. 743 and 744) for sending an Ambassador to Tel Aviv illustrates the other side of their policy.

7. The United Kingdom's policy has latterly appeared to the Iraqis as ambivalent and this impression, combined with a lingering desire to give us the benefit of the doubt, has been responsible for many of the ups and downs in Anglo/Iraqi relations in the last few months. Although by the end of last year there was already a feeling that we had been gradually slipping from our position of neutrality, the general



rumpus in the Arab world over reports of our selling tanks to Israel in February aroused all the old Iraqi suspicions of British policy once again. We weathered this storm comparatively quickly and members of the Government again began to intimate that they wished for improved relations with the United Kingdom. For instance, at The Queen's Birthday Party on the 14th of June, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sayid Abdul Karim al Sheikhly, specifically said that the presence of the two Deputy Prime Ministers and himself at the party showed that their policy was to improve relations with the United Kingdom. As recently as the 25th of July General Ammash himself expressed similar hopes for an improvement in relations and appreciation not only of our policy on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute but also of the Arab/Israel problem. Only a short time before a senior Government official very close to the Minister of Foreign Affairs told me that the Iraqi Government were happy at our "neutral position" in Arab/Israel affairs.

8. I fear, however, that at least some of these expressions of appreciation were based on a misunderstanding of our general position about the supply of arms to Israel and in particular misunderstanding of the Commons debate in July. Since Nasser's speech on the 23rd of July criticising our hypocrisy, the Iraqi Press has at all events been following a line very similar to the Egyptians and the *Baghdad Observer* has for instance described "Britain's policy in the Middle East" as "ambidextrous". President Nasser's meeting in mid-August with President Atassi and various statements made by the Prime Minister of the Sudan, Sayid Babiker Awadallah, suggest that fresh attempts are being made, at least among the Socialist States, to formulate a general Arab policy which would bind Governments to order relations with foreign countries according to their attitudes towards the Arab/Israel problem. If we are to maintain even tolerable relations with Iraq and other countries following this policy, it will be increasingly important not to take any action which seems to detract from our

announced policy of seeking a peaceful solution based on Resolution No. 242—particularly as long as the Israelis remain in control of the territory occupied in 1967 and appear to the Arabs more aggressive, expansionist and intransigent than ever.

9. In their relations with IPC the Iraqi Government has shown that it is to some extent applying the same cardinal principle of foreign policy. The greatly improved atmosphere between Government and company and the expressed desire of a number of important Iraqi leaders to negotiate a settlement is attributable at least in part to the favourable impression of the company created by their financing the publication of pamphlets on the plight of the Arab refugees.

10. In the period immediately following the resumption of diplomatic relations our return to Baghdad was—since the central issue of our attitude on Palestine seemed to have been settled reasonably satisfactorily—very widely welcomed by Ministers, Government officials and ordinary people, as well as merchants who were keen to re-establish links with their traditional sources of supply. I and the other commercial officers received an exceptionally friendly welcome—to an extent which surprised us—not only from the Private Sector but also from Public Sector organisations and the Government Departments on which we called. For a time at least the old colonialist enemy seemed to have become the old friend. Iraqis as a whole seemed keen to re-establish the traditionally cordial trading relations as quickly as possible and the results are already apparent in our trade statistics. Iraqis seem to have a more developed penchant for British goods than one could reasonably expect and this penchant extends to other things British as well, including wives, of whom there are now some 250. All this prompted the Pakistani Military Attaché to remark recently "I have never seen such suckers for the British as the Iraqis". Immediately after the resumption of relations some Iraqis intimated that they hoped we would exercise greater political



influence again and when I paid the first official visit to Basra since the break, all the dignitaries from the Mutasarrif downwards immediately asked when, rather than if, we were going to re-establish the Consulate-General. (In fact we are reduced to the possibility of a mere Honorary Consul.) Culturally the resumption of the British Council's activities was looked forward to with great keenness and the Iraqis appear happy now that they are back. Nor has the Iraqi propensity for visiting the United Kingdom as frequently as possible on leave or duty in any way diminished.

11. British goods enjoy an extremely high reputation and British machinery is used in nearly every aspect of Iraq's industrial and rural life. Ruston engines are widely used for irrigation, Massey Ferguson tractors are a best-seller and Iraqi Airways operate British aircraft, the newest of which are Tridents. Iraqi Service uniforms often closely resemble those of the British forces and the armed forces, particularly the Iraqi Air Force, retain great respect for British equipment and training methods. Baghdad has a bus system which has taken much from London Transport and red double-decker buses made by AEC are a familiar feature of the Baghdad streets. On a grey winter day when the gulls are wheeling over the Tigris one can even be reminded of the Thames as the red buses cross and re-cross the bridges. Cultural contacts too are very strong. A very considerable number of Iraqis have been educated in the United Kingdom and the Government still prefer to send their young men to the United Kingdom for post-graduate degrees. There are approximately 900 there at the present time. Some of the products of this policy now hold high office—for example the Minister of Planning, Dr. Jawad Hashim, who is a London Ph.D., and Dr. Salah Sheikhly, the Director-General of the Central Bureau of Statistics, who holds two English post-graduate degrees. But these are only two of a large number, some of whom have international reputations. Ties in the medical sphere are also extremely strong and many Iraqi doctors hold British qualifications. Amongst

older Iraqis, and even some of the younger generation, British methods and British justice are still highly regarded. This leads many of them—not only those who worked with the RAF at Habbaniya—to look back somewhat nostalgically to the days when our influence was greater. Perhaps surprisingly the reputation of the early British administrators of Iraq remains high amongst the more well-informed and even in the countryside.

12. On the other hand the complexes created during the "colonial" and "royalist" eras remain and some of the old suspicions still haunt us. We are credited with greater power and influence than we now possess and it is perhaps this which makes us the target of the security authorities. Our telephones are tapped and interfered with to an oppressive degree and many Iraqis are prevented from coming to the Embassy, which in any case they are reluctant to do as they retain superstitions about being seen going "to the other side". The Director of the British School of Archaeology was even not granted a permit to dig this season. Petty officialdom can be irritating and it is amongst this class that the strongest anti-British feeling probably exists. However, we are probably not subjected to more onerous administrative delays and procedures than other people and on some occasions officials go out of their way to be helpful simply because one is British.

13. Many Iraqis, as well as some Egyptians, believe that the present Government in Baghdad is supported by the United Kingdom and might have fallen by now had it not been for assistance from the British Intelligence Services. In 1963 the Baathists were, I believe, notably friendly towards the British and many people consider that this situation has been repeated and that the Iraqi attitude is reciprocated. So strong is this impression that a Kurdish friend told me with some heat recently that the previous Ambassador's policy in supporting the Baathist régime was dangerously misguided!



14. Despite a Press which is now not infrequently hostile to us and the West and *pro-bloc*, there is an enormous reservoir of goodwill towards us in Iraq. Political factors, however, make it difficult as it were to install a pipe of any large diameter to syphon it off and, even if we could, we might find the water partially contaminated—by complexes. The most effective ways of tapping the reservoir in the future are through closer economic and cultural ties. If we were to negotiate a Government-to-Government loan for the purchase of British goods and at the same time clear up outstanding British claims and also to step up our technical assistance programme, our position could be considerably improved. But if our policy and actions over the Arab/Israel dispute give the Iraqis the impression that we are favouring the Israelis—particularly if we were to supply them with significant quantities of arms—then I fear that the considerable advantages, commercial and otherwise, which we have

in this country will rapidly vanish. Already neutral observers consider that our coolness towards the Iraqis has pushed them closer to the USSR during the last year. Many of the Baathists now in power in Baghdad would not wish to fall further under the influence of the USSR, but they would turn more in the direction of the East if, having proffered the hand of friendship to the United Kingdom, they felt they had been grossly deceived and that Britain had aligned herself completely with the United States, who are now undoubtedly regarded here as “public enemy No. 1”.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Tehran and Tel Aviv, and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

D. F. HAWLEY.



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**Near Eastern Department,**

**10 September, 1969.**

NEQ 3/548/1

We have just received your two despatches - "The Iraqis and the British" and the other (untitled by you) which, I think we might call "A year under the Ba'ath".

2. We found them very interesting reading and have arranged that they both should be printed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Whitehall distribution. As you know from your recent visit, there has been a good deal of interest in Iraqi affairs recently.

3. We will be considering what action we should take on the points which you made in your despatch on the Iraqis and the British. We agree, in particular, on the necessity of developing closer cultural relations and we are asking the British Council to see if they can increase the scale of their effort in Iraq, although like Whitehall department, they are under great financial pressure, and they are having to consider what redeployment may be necessary in the light of the Duncan Report.

(A.A. Acland)

D.F. Hawley, Esq.,  
Baghdad.

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Registry  
No.

**DRAFT** letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

D.F. Hawley, Esq.,  
Baghdad.

From

A.A. Acland  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department  
N.E.D

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

We have just received your two despatches -

"The Iraqis and the British and the other (untitled by you) which, I think we <sup>might</sup> ~~should~~ call "A year under the Ba'ath" & .

2. We found them very interesting reading and have <sup>arranged</sup> ~~asked~~ that they both should be <sup>printed in the</sup> ~~given wide~~ Foreign & Commonwealth Office / Whitehall distribution, circulation in the office and within Whitehall

As you know from your recent visit, there has been a ~~where various people have displayed, of late, a~~ <sup>good deal of</sup> keen interest in Iraqi affairs recently.

3. We will be <sup>considering what action we should take</sup> ~~replying more substantially later~~

<sup>since</sup> on the points you made in your despatch on the Iraqis and the British. We agree, in particular, on the necessity of developing closer cultural relations and we are asking the British Council to see if they can increase the scale of their effort in Iraq, although the Whitehall departments,

they are under great financial pressure, & they are having to consider what redeployment may be necessary in the light of the Duncan Report.

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*Acland*

*You asked  
for a draft  
acknowledgment  
of the two  
despatches*

*PMM:thall*

*9/9/69*



NEQ 3/548/1

NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

I attach a copy of Baghdad despatch No. 3/1....  
.... of 25 August, received in Department 5 September

I have/~~have not~~ sent this despatch for printing  
~~FCO/FCO-WH/Volume only~~, with ~~A/C Commonwealth distribution~~.

A.A. Ireland

Assistant

I recommend that it be given priority printing.

do not recommend

I propose to submit the minuted copy

do not propose

unless otherwise instructed.

A.A. Ireland

in Head of Department

Walter reading.

R. Hayman 11/9

R. Hayman 11/9

Mr. Arthur

Mr. Hayman

Sir Denis Greenhill

P.S.  
✓ you will see in print.  
R. Baker  
12/9

4/10  
(pessimistic with  
some hopes - as  
it should be!)

(PRINTED)



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Mr. Heyman

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 - 5 SEP 1969 NEQ 3/548/1
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Anglo/Iraqi Relations

Sir D. Greenhill recently raised the question of Anglo/Iraqi relations.

2. These have not been satisfactory for some time but it seems difficult to find ways of improving them in present circumstances. From time to time individual Iraqis make overtures to the Embassy in Baghdad on political or commercial matters, or about the possibility of ministerial visits, which seem to indicate that there is a desire in some Iraqi circles for an improvement in our relations. At the same time, however, they appear to want to attach impossible conditions. These usually relate either to prior agreement with the IPC on outstanding issues (which would involve a very large cash payment by the Company to the Iraq Government) or an undertaking by H.M.G. to supply unspecified quantities of certain types of arms. On both we are unable to meet the Iraqis for good reasons.

3. We have however asked ourselves whether because of these unfavourable auguries we have been missing opportunities for breaking out of this circle. I do not think so. The Department has prepared a paper, which is now attached, which sets out British interests in Iraq and analyses whether there is any way we can, in our own interests, improve Anglo/Iraqi relations. The conclusion is disappointingly negative but seems realistic.

4. The paper has been seen by Oil Department, the Planning Staff, Financial Policy and Aid Department, Cultural Relations Department and by Defence Training and Supply Department and has taken into account the comments made by these departments as well as the observations made by Mr. Arthur who agreed with the conclusions of the original draft.

*J.P. Tripp*  
(J.P. Tripp)  
20 July 1969

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Anglo-Iraqi Relations

Conclusions

We must recognise the extent of British interests and the limitations on our increasing them.

2. Our economic interests in Iraq, particularly the IPC, are not significantly affected by the state of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

3. Even if we thought it desirable to make a major effort to improve relations we should be limited by the following:

- (a) No modification of our policy towards Israel is likely to go far enough to suit the Iraqis.
- (b) We cannot "deliver" the Iraq Petroleum Company.
- (c) The restrictions which our arms supply policy enforce on us make it impossible for us to meet all Iraqi arms requirements.
- (d) Iraq's repressive and occasionally barbaric acts provoke hostile comment in the British press and radio which tends to enflame the Iraqi regime.

4. Anglo-Iraqi relations are therefore likely to remain unsatisfactory for some time to come.

5. While we should preserve and encourage commercial and cultural, e.g. British Council, links, we would not be justified in diverting more of our overseas effort to Iraq in the present circumstances.

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British Interests

Oil

The main British interest and investment in Iraq is the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Details of the Company's constitution and operations are at Annex A. This is an investment worth preserving but not at a price which would adversely affect the more important operations of the British member companies of IPC elsewhere. The risks of instability in Iraq are very great and the companies cannot be sure that any settlement which they might make would last. Iraq oil, though cheap and convenient (particularly since some 70% of it is made available on the Mediterranean coast), is not vital for either Shell or B.P.

Trade

2. Apart from the IPC we have an interest in trade, about £18 m. per year, which in favourable circumstances could be somewhat increased. One estimate [JIC(B)(69)1] is that British exports to Iraq could rise to £27 m. by 1973, on the assumption that the U.K.'s share of the Iraqi market will not fall below 11%.

Political

3. Our political interest is to ensure that Iraq does not intervene to the detriment of British interests elsewhere, particularly in Kuwait and the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, or conceivably in Jordan. Apart from these interests we need not much mind what regime is in power in Iraq (so

/long

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-2-

long as it is not a complete Soviet satellite). Iran is strong enough to stand on her own feet against Iraq. The threat to British interests in the Gulf would also be increased if the revolutionary governments of Iraq and Syria were to unite their two countries. Such a union would increase the isolation of Jordan and strengthen the forces of extremism in the Middle East who are intransigent in their attitude to the Arab/Israel dispute.

Culture

4. We also have a long term interest in the activities of the British Council in Iraq (these were in abeyance during the break in diplomatic relations). Here some investment is certainly worthwhile as it is to our advantage to exploit the educational links between the two countries and to make use of the widespread demands amongst Iraqis to learn English as a second language. (A note on the function and activities of the British Council is at Annex C).

Would better relations with the Iraqis affect their policies in our favour?

5. Since the revolution in 1958 the fortunes of the IPC have not been significantly influenced by the warmth or coolness of official Anglo/Iraqi relations, nor has the level of trade. When we had no diplomatic relations, neither the IPC nor British trade interests suffered significantly. It is not likely that Anglo/Iraqi relations can so develop in the

/foreseeable

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-3-

foreseeable future, that we will be able, on our own, significantly to influence Iraq's policies towards Kuwait and the Gulf. Particularly after our withdrawal in 1971, the security of Kuwait and the Arab States will be dependent on other factors (membership of the United Nations, Arab opinion and influences, the balance of power in the area, the policies of Iran - to mention only a few). Anglo/Iraqi relations would no doubt be more comfortable, and it would be easier to open and maintain a dialogue with the Iraqis, if General Takriti and others of his way of thinking were in power. But they are not - yet. Even if they were, the strains and stresses within Iraq and the checks and balances on any Iraqi regime would severely limit the influence which the United Kingdom could have on Iraq's policies. Even if we thought that British interests would be significantly served by an improvement in Anglo/Iraqi relations could we bring this improvement about?

6. H.M. Ambassador Baghdad has listed the following as essential factors in Anglo/Iraqi relations:- British policy towards Israel and the Arab/Israel dispute; IPC's negotiations with the Iraq Government; British arms sales to Iraq; and, as a lesser issue, offers of aid.

- (a) U.K. attitude towards Israel and the Arab/Israel dispute

It is inconceivable that this attitude will change  
/enough

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enough to impress the Iraqis favourably. We are committed to the survival of Israel and to a policy of even-handedness in our relations with Israel and the Arab States. This is likely to continue. So is our policy of maintaining a balance in arms supplies to the Arabs and Israel.

(b) Oil and the IPC's negotiations

Our policy has been and must remain that this is primarily a commercial matter to be settled according to IPC's commercial judgement of where their best interests lie. We do not rule out offering advice or even putting pressure on the company if this seemed clearly in the British interest. Such a situation has not yet arisen, however; and to urge the company towards a settlement would, if successful, probably only result in putting money in the pocket of the Iraq Government without necessarily obtaining any guarantees for better operating conditions for the Company for the future. The implications of the recent agreements between Iraq and the Soviet Union are not yet clear, but at present there seems no need to modify this view, in the light of them. (An initial assessment, together with an account of current IPC attitudes and an analysis of probable Soviet motives is at Annex B.)

(c) Arms sales

We have comparatively little room for manoeuvre.

/We

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-5-

We have to consider sales to Iraq in the context of our relations with Iran and in the light of Iraqi ambitions towards Kuwait and the Persian Gulf and her hostility towards Israel. Our defence commitment to Kuwait (until May 1971 anyway) is another inhibiting factor. Iraqi training of the Omani rebels is a further discouragement to our supplying even small arms and mortars. Finally, the balance between the Arabs and Israel has to be maintained.

(d) Aid

Funds for aid are limited (£10,000 provisionally allocated for Iraq this financial year) and unless we see obvious benefit to British interests we would not be justified in allocating a higher proportion of scarce resources to a country consistently critical of Britain over the past years. Nor is it clear that gestures now would pay future dividends, either in terms of British interests or in terms of pre-empting communist influences which might be positively damaging.

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ANNEX A

The I.P.C.

The IPC is a British-registered operating company owned by the following interests:

Shell	23 $\frac{3}{4}$ %
B.P.	"
CFP	"
Esso/Mobil	"
Gulbenkian Interests	5%

The Company has operated in Iraq since the early 1920s: share participation has not changed since those days. The Basra and Mosul Petroleum Companies were smaller and separate companies with the same share participation formed later to operate the Basra and Mosul oil-fields respectively. Reference to the IPC in a general context comprises these two companies also.

2. The IPC concession dates from 1925. By the terms of this, the Company was awarded a concession area of virtually the whole territory of Iraq.

3. The Company continued to make steady progress in oil production until the 1958 Iraq revolution. The Kirkuk production was shipped to Banias in Syria and Tripoli in Lebanon, by the IPC pipeline: Mosul production was piped down to the Baghdad refinery, and the Basra production was exported by sea via the Shatt al Arab.

4. In the last years of Kassem's rule a dispute arose over  
/the

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-2-

the Company's operations. As a retaliatory act against the IPC, Kassem in 1961 nationalised 99.46% of the Company's concession area, by Law 80. In 1967 a further Iraqi law allocated the area thus expropriated to the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC). The IPC were ~~thme~~ left with merely the area of their immediate production. The area taken from them included the North Rumaila field proved by the drill to be one of the richest oil reservoirs in the world. For the Company this last asset is of prime importance, not because of the oil it contained (which was not of immediate interest to the Company except to insure that ~~the~~ oil resources there should be denied to its competitors), but because of the damaging precedent which a successful expropriation would create for British and Western oil companies' operations elsewhere in the Middle East.

5. For this reason IPC has been diligent in warning off, with a threat of legal action, any Western company which appeared to be close to agreeing to work it for the Iraqis.

6. Moreover, Iraqi oil production has twice in the last three years been affected by extraneous political considerations: in 1966, the Syrians closed the Tripoli pipeline for a few months following a dispute with the Company. And in 1967 the Iraqis interrupted the export of oil following the June War with Israel.

7. As a result, Iraqi oil production has not experienced

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-3-

the dramatic increase recorded elsewhere in the Middle East.  
Recent production figures are as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>(In millions of barrels)</u> <u>Production of</u> <u>crude oil</u>
1966	506.9
1967	447.6
1968	521.0

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ANNEX B

IPC's Relations with the Iraq Government in the  
light of the recent Iraqi Agreements with the Soviet  
Union and an Assessment of Soviet Oil Policy in Iraq

The agreements concluded recently between Iraq and the Soviet Union for the development of Iraq's oil resources lend support to the IPC's expectation that Iraq will not tolerate the existing situation of stalemate in their dispute with the Company much longer. The situation existing prior to the signature of those agreements suited the Company well enough on economic grounds, in that they continued to make profits on sales of crude oil produced, while on the other side of the ledger, expenditure on production facilities was virtually at a standstill. But on general grounds, e.g. staff morale, and the uncertainty over Iraqi intentions, their position was difficult enough. The Company therefore judged that they had soon to make a further attempt at a settlement. They admit that they had very little up their sleeve that had not been offered and rejected already. But they were not willing to pay extortionately in order to stay in business in Iraq.

2. The Soviet-Iraqi agreements have now altered this picture to a considerable extent, though it is still too early for us to judge whether they have made the situation irretrievable from the IPC's point of view. But if now presented with an unacceptable challenge by the Iraqis (e.g. over development

/of

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-2-

of the North Rumaila field with Soviet assistance) the Company would probably be prepared for an open breach. If it were the Company's judgment that even now they could and should attempt a settlement, we would not dissent. Now would we be likely to dissent if they chose to pursue an alternative policy, e.g. to try to maintain the status quo for as long as they could or to stand fast if their rights were further threatened.

3. A possibility which should be kept in mind (and which has been considered by the Assessments Staff) is that in the event of a complete break between Iraq and the IPC arising from the agreements with the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. might be prepared to fill the gap in earnings and imports which this would cause. The practical effect of this would be to make Iraq entirely dependent on the Soviet bloc, and this would increase the threat to our interests in the Gulf.

4. For the Soviet Union such an eventuality would hardly be an attractive proposition on economic grounds. Even if the Iraqis could, with Soviet assistance, physically maintain production from the whole IPC concession area, there is little chance that they could sell any crude oil so produced for hard currency and certainly not in the quantities which the IPC are now putting on to the market. In theory, cheap oil at Basra and at a Mediterranean terminal might look attractive to the Soviet Union. However, in practice the Russians would

/find

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-3-

find it impossible, at short notice (and possibly even in the long run also) to dispose of the quantities which the IPC are producing at present, particularly if the Company were threatening legal action against anyone who bought it. (The J.I.C. concluded that INOC might not be able to sell more than 20 million tons of North Iraq crude if the IPC were nationalised). Iraq would therefore lose drastically by driving out or nationalising the IPC. The Russians would have to set against their enhanced influence in such circumstances, the probability that they would have to make good the loss of the major part of the IPC revenues. The Russians will no doubt continue to meddle in Iraq, but may not attempt a complete takeover. In view of the general assessment in paragraph 1 above, therefore, we would have less reason to worry from the point of view of British oil interests if the IPC were to adopt a firm attitude, than if they were to display an unduly pliant attitude which could affect Western concessions elsewhere, or lead other producer Governments to think that they could intensify pressure on oil companies with impunity.

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ANNEX C

British Council

A long term British interest in Iraq is represented by the activities of the British Council which were abruptly curtailed (on Iraqi insistence) at the time of the break in diplomatic relations in June 1967.

2. A British Council Representative has now returned and, apart from locally engaged employees, he should eventually have an expatriate staff of three. This is considerably smaller than pre-June war establishment.

3. Owing to the close Anglo-Iraqi relationship which existed from the start of the mandate until the revolution of 1958 there are still strong educational and (to a lesser extent) sentimental ties linking Iraq with this country. Students, some sponsored by the Iraqi Ministries of Education and Oil and also by the I.P.C., come here for further education. Others come privately or on British Council scholarships. The Council helps to process the bulk of these visitors whatever their means of support.

4. The British Council representative may be asked to advise the Iraqi Ministry of Education; he supervises the large library which is a useful shop window for Britain and the 'British way of life' through its wide selection of books and periodicals and he is also responsible for the administration of all British examinations (e.g. London University) held in Iraq.

/5.

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-2-

5. The Council regards its most important function there (as elsewhere) as English Language teaching. Before the June war of 1967 there were plans to set up an English language teaching institute to be run by a joint Committee of Iraqis and representatives of the British Embassy and financed by funds accruing from the abortive Anglo/Iraqi Al-Khindi Club which was to have been set up with money (£150,000) donated by the Iraq Government in cancellation of their debts to the U.K. Government. The Council representative in Baghdad reports a heavy demand for English language teaching and suggests that, initially at any rate, the English Language Teaching Institute should be set up in the Council Centre and then be transferred to a more permanent base in due course. This proposal is under consideration by the British Council at present and if approved, can be implemented fairly quickly.

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1. Mr. Hayman
2. Miss Sand
3. Mr. Hayman

4. Mr. Zair
  5. Mr. Benda
- May also  
like to see

Mr. Zair

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REGISTRY No. 10	
- 5 SEP 1969	

Permanent Under-Secretary

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1. The paper achieves a lot of agreement with its recommendations. I particularly agree with the agreement with the French on the future of the Council (such as it is) and the spread of English influence here.

2. We should attempt a European Council, starting with the French and the British. The spread of English influence here.

30/7

I agree

HL  
9/8

### Anglo/Iraqi Relations

I agree with the recommendations in the paper below.

2. I suggest that the only useful field in which we can make progress at present is that of the British Council. The new Head of the British Council in Baghdad is Mr. John Springford from Amman of whom Mr. Tripp thinks very highly. When I was in Iraq, the work of the British Council in the teaching of English, the provision of University professors and in student exchanges, was of the utmost importance. I think that there is still much to be done in these fields. Iraq is one of those countries in which we need to make use of the fact that Britain is well known to the present generation, but may well be comparatively unknown to the next generation.

3. I would propose to talk about all this to Mr. Balfour Paul before he goes out to Baghdad.

P. T. Hayman

(P.T. Hayman)  
21 July, 1969.

This is a useful paper. I agree that we, in the UK, do not have much room for manoeuvre. But it is a UK and Western interest to try to ensure that Iraq does not fall deeper and deeper

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into Soviet clutches. The fact that  
Oz and the Europeans do not work as  
a group to prevent this helps the  
Russians steadily into a stronger  
position. Iraq therefore seems to me  
a pre eminently suitable subject for  
political consultation with our  
European partners, and a subject  
in which European and American  
interests coincide to a large extent. If  
you agree I think we should proceed  
first to talk to the French and then to  
other Europeans to see what can be done  
to stop the rot. We can go ahead on our  
own about the British Council. D.M. Greenhill  
25/7.


M<sup>r</sup> Roberts.  
Private Secy

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/ The paper achieves



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The paper achieves a true perspective and I agree with its recommendations.

2. I particularly agree with the reasoning in Sir D. Greenhill's minute.

- (a) We should attempt a European consensus, starting with the French, not only because of the substantial CFP holding in IPC but also because they are essential to a joint European approach to Middle East questions generally. And in the wider interest of our application to EEC the more we work with them the better.
- (b) We should put as much of our money as we can on British Council. The spread of the English language, leading to increased educational, cultural and commercial contact, is vital to our future influence. The French push their own language for these reasons but in Iraq at least we are not in conflict with them on this score.

*Gordon Roberts.*

(G.O. Roberts)  
30 July, 1969

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD.

TELEGRAM NUMBER 803.

TO FOREIGN AND COMMON

12 SEPTEMBER 1969.



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MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SHEIKHLY, TOLD COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR THAT HE WOULD BE SPENDING ONE DAY (NOT YET KNOWN WHICH) IN LONDON NEXT WEEK ON HIS WAY TO NEW YORK TO HEAD IRAQI DELEGATION. HE WOULD NOT HAVE TIME, HOWEVER, TO MAKE ANY CALLS. ON HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK HE HOPED TO SPEND LONGER IN LONDON FOR A MEDICAL QUOTE CHECK UP UNQUOTE.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

## F I L E S

N. EAST. DEPT.  
N. AFR. DEPT.  
ARAB. DEPT.  
MIG. & VISA DEPT.  
U.N.D.  
MR. HAYMAN  
MR. ARTHUR

*R* *AMM*  
15/1

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A.A.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 19 SEP 1969 NEQ 3/548/1
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Copy to NEQ 3/304/1  
Meeting with Dr. Daud

189.  
Mr. Mayhew.  
Reg.  
IRs  
hwy Elwell  
ave  
24/9  
p.a.  
Jm 30/9

I called on Dr. Mahmud Ali Daud on 9 September in order to amplify what I had told him on the telephone on Saturday 6 September about HMG's recognition of the new regime in Libya. The following points arose:-

(i) U.K./Iraq Relations

I said that the Iraqi press did not appear to have carried the news of our recognition of the new regime in Libya and there was no mention of it in the Baghdad Observer in particular. Dr. Daud said that the announcement had in fact been carried in all the Arabic newspapers and he had seen this for himself (incidentally he thanked me for the courtesy of letting him know of HMG's decision in advance of the announcement).

I then told Dr. Daud that there seemed to be an increasing tendency for the Iraqi press to attack the U.K. and asked what he thought of this. He replied that as far as he knew it was official policy to have good relations with the U.K. and he considered that relations were, despite some ups and downs, good, particularly in the commercial and cultural spheres. I said that I was glad to hear this as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Deputy Prime Ministers had all assured me - apart from assurances made to the previous Ambassador - that they wanted improved relations with us. However, the article headed "The British Secret Document" on page 2 of the Baghdad Observer on Sunday 7 September was a rather glaring example of a hostile attack. This had appeared on the day after we had recognised Libya and after I had formally told him of this fact. Dr. Daud looked at the article and said that he would report the matter to his Minister. It certainly seemed inconsistent with official policy. He then suggested that the Press Attaché should call on Mr. Hindawi to discuss the question of the way we had been featured in the press of late.

(ii) Relations with the U.S.

Dr. Daud said that the Iraq Government had been very put out at the manner in which the State Department official spokesman had referred to the Phantom deal after the demarche by the Arab Ambassadors in Washington. It had been unnecessary to name the Arabs and to say blatantly that the deal "was in the interests of the Israelis". He considered that the American attitude was disastrous. It was



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one of the contributory causes of the changes of regime in Libya and the Sudan. The U.S. should behave as a great power and not as a partisan. Their attitude had led to the loss of major economic and cultural interests in the Middle East and it was colouring the Arabs' attitude towards the whole Western world. The intelligencia of the Arab world were particularly worried at the present course of events. Many of them had been educated by the Americans and had a respect for Western ideas and ideals. They were therefore sorry to see U.S. and Western influence ebbing in the Arab world on account of the United States' attitude to the Arab/Israel dispute.

(iii) The New Libya Regime

Dr. Dand said that the Iraqi Government was well content with the new regime in Libya. He welcomed the fact that the new government would pursue a "more forward" Arab policy.

(D. F. Hawley)  
10 September 1969

c.c. Mr. J. P. Tripp,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.



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ROUTINE BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NUMBER 821

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

19 SEPTEMBER 1969

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO. 821 OF 19 SEPTEMBER REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO CAIRO, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEHRAN,  
BAHRAIN, KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR NEW YORK ON 15 SEPTEMBER,

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 22 SEP 1969 NEQ 3/548/1
--

FOREIGN MINISTER HAD<sup>PA</sup> MADE NO RESPONSE TO MY REQUESTS, <sup>22/9</sup>  
REPEATED AT INTERVALS SINCE ARRIVING ON 4 SEPTEMBER, TO PAY MY  
INITIAL CALL. BY CONTRAST, AMMASH (DEPUTY P.M.) ARRANGED TO  
RECEIVE ME AS SOON AS HE TOOK OVER THE CHAIR AND WENT  
OUT OF HIS WAY TO BE AMIABLE AND EXPANSIVE. HE APOLOGISED  
FOR THE INABILITY OF SMEIKHLY (WHO HAD IN FACT BEEN  
ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY IN ORBIT) TO SEE ME AND PROMISED  
TO HASTEN PRESENTATION ~~OF MY~~ CREDENTIALS.  
HE DISCLOSED THAT WHAT PRESIDENT BAKR  
HAS BEEN SUFFERING FROM IS DIABETES, WHICH  
EXPLAINS WHY NASSER RECENTLY SENT HIM HIS PERSONAL  
PHYSICIAN.

/2. AT

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- 2 -

2. AT OUTSET OF CALL AMMASH LAUNCHED SPONTANEOUSLY INTO THE SUBJECT OF IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST BLOC. IN THE OLD DAYS THE VERY IDEA OF HAVING DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAD SEEMED QUOTE TERRIFYING UNQUOTE. NOWADAYS, HOWEVER, THE IRAQIS COULD SEE NO GOOD REASON FOR REJECTING COMMUNIST OFFERS OF HELP. THEY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO DEAL WITH THE BRITISH; BUT ALTHOUGH THEY STILL RECOGNISED THE QUALITY OF BRITISH GOODS, THE COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE HAD ALLOWED THE SOVIET UNION TO OVERTAKE THEM BOTH IN THE SCOPE OF THEIR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND IN THE CREDIT TERMS, ETC., OFFERED. A POOR COUNTRY HAD TO SEEK HELP WHERE IT COULD GET IT CHEAPEST. HE DID NOT DENY, WHEN I INTERVENED, THAT THE SOVIET BLOC'S AID POLICY WAS NOT PURELY ALTRUISTIC. OF COURSE THERE WERE ULTERIOR MOTIVES. BUT TO MY ~~SUGGESTION~~ THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE STRAIGHT COMMERCIAL TERMS ON WHICH WESTERN TRADE AND AID POLICIES WERE BASED MIGHT SERVE A DEVELOPING COUNTRY'S INTERESTS BETTER, HE REPEATED THAT THE POOR HAVE LITTLE OPTION. IN THE TIME OF QUOTE HIS ANCESTOR HAMMURABI UNQUOTE IRAQ HAD ENJOYED A FLOURISHING CIVILISATION. ONE DAY THEY WOULD DO SO AGAIN. WHEN I OBSERVED THAT HIS ANCESTOR HAMMURABI HAD NOT DEVOTED SO HIGH A PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL INCOME TO DEFENCE, HE TOOK IT IN GOOD PART.

/3. THE

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GHADAD TELEGRAM NO. 821 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

- 3 -

3. THE GIST OF HIS REMARKS ON OTHER SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, NOTABLY I P C NEGOTIATIONS, HAS BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY (TELEGRAMS NOS. 816 AND 818).

4. ALLOWANCE MADE FOR CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN INITIAL CALL AND FOR AMMASH'S NOTED CAPACITY FOR DECEIT, HIS RELAXED AFFABILITY STRUCK ME AND COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR, WHO WAS PRESENT, AS MEANINGFUL AND ENCOURAGING.

FCO PASS TO SAVING CAIRO, AMMAN ,BEIRUT, TEHRAN, BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, AND JEDDA.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
BAGHDAD.

15 September 1969

Dear Anthony,

125

Reg & p.a.  
Jm 23/9

Thank you very much for your letter of 10 September. I was very glad to hear that you found the despatches useful and am grateful for what you are doing to follow up the recommendations made.

2. I am sorry one of them arrived without a title. The title must have disappeared in my rush to get away to London. It did in fact originally have precisely the same title as you have decided to give it.

Yours Ever

Donald Hawley

(D. F. Hawley)

A. A. Acland, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.



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PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELNO. 846

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

25 SEPTEMBER 1969

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*Now see  
f. 132  
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AFTER THREE WEEKS HERE I HAVE STILL NOT PRESENTED MY CREDENTIALS. RESPONSE TO YESTERDAY'S RENEWED ENQUIRY BY COUNSELOR WAS THAT PRESIDENT BAKR IS VERY BUSY, MIGHT BE ABLE TO RECEIVE ME THIS WEEK, BUT MORE LIKELY NEXT WEEK.

2. THREE WEEKS WAIT IS APPARENTLY NORMAL UNDER PRESENT REGIME, BUT ANY LONGER DELAY WILL LOOK LIKE DELIBERATE AFFRONT.

3. SINCE AMMASH, WHEN I CALLED TO GIVE HIM COPIES OF MY CREDENTIALS ON 17 SEPTEMBER, UNDERTOOK TO HASTEN THINGS, I THINK THE TIME HAS COME FOR ME TO TAKE HIM UP ON THIS PERSONALLY. BEFORE DOING SO, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHETHER THERE IS ANY ROUGH YARDSTICK AT THE COURT OF ST. JAMES WITH WHICH I MIGHT BEAT HIM.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO 847

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

25TH SEPTEMBER 1969

*draft letter.*

*Now p.a.*

*Jan 29/7*

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Mytel No 846.

Notification now received that ceremony concerned will take place 29th September.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

NR EAST DEPT

PROT & CONF DEPT



EN CLAIR

~~LAST PAPER~~

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BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 851 29 SEPTEMBER 1969

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I TODAY PRESENTED MY CREDENTIALS TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 30 SEP 1969 NEQ 3/548/1
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FILES

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

PROT. & CONFCE. DEPT.

*Regy.*  
*Pl copy to ✓ done*  
*P.O.D. ✓*  
*Heads of Mission Sec.*  
*Miss Fisher*  
*Hen p. 2*  
*Djha 1/10*

~~LAST PAPER~~

NNNNN



Confidential

To. Mr Balfour Paul  
BaghdadFrom

Mr Tapp

JH  
29/9Credentials:

Though in your telegram  
846 you asked for a  
yardstick with which to  
beat the Iraqis, we think  
this may now prove to be  
a broken reed - of the delay  
may be as much as three  
months here. In any  
case in view of your  
later telegram 847 there  
seems no point in  
shutting the stable door  
now the bird has flown.

Noted & send  
Mishaw  
JH  
30.9.

Mr. Maxson

JH

JH

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN





Never  
printed -

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SUMMARY



Presentation of Credentials

After some delay, which was probably not intended as a deliberate affront, the Ambassador presented his credentials to the President of Iraq on the 29th of September.

Description of the ceremony. (Paragraphs 1 - 3).

2. In his speech the Ambassador expressed the hope that the improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations achieved since diplomatic ties were resumed might be consolidated. The President's reply conceded little more than the minimum required by courtesy. (Paragraph 4).

3. In the private interview which followed, the President spoke about Palestine and Iraq's dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company. (Paragraphs 5 - 8).

4. It seems improbable that a régime headed by President Bakr will go far to make possible an improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations. Since the prospects of a change of government seem small and there is no guarantee that any change would not be for the worse, Britain's policy should be based on the assumption that the present régime is here to stay and that we should make the best of a bad job. (Paragraphs 9 - 10).

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BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD  
30 September 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir,

As reported in my telegram No. 851 of the 29th of September, I yesterday, after waiting some three and a half weeks, presented to the President of the Iraqi Republic the Letters accrediting me as Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Baghdad.

2. Despite some mild speculation in the diplomatic corps and the British community about the reason for the President's delay in receiving me, I doubt whether there was any deliberate affront intended. A delay of up to three weeks is not unusual under the present régime; President Bakr has been suffering from diabetes and other rumoured complaints; the Foreign Minister is, and has been since my arrival, in almost perpetual motion; and the detectable air of fatigue enveloping the government apparatus (not wholly attributable to the effects of summer) may have played a part. On the other hand, the staging of my reception in the cramped ambience of the President's private office, the unexpected absence of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and his replacement by an ageing cipher entitled the Inspector General, and the lack of warmth in the President's general demeanour (markedly  
/different

The Right Honourable  
Michael Stewart, M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.

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different from that adopted by General Ammash when he received me a fortnight ago) were not particularly reassuring.

3. In other external respects, however, the ceremony was conducted with full courtesy. The principal Protocol Officer at the Palace and the Master of Ceremonies called at my house with the Presidential Rolls Royce, Bentley and outriders, to convey myself and the four senior members of my staff past a guard of honour into the imposing pre-revolutionary seat of government, where I was soon conducted through a posse of soldiers in Bulgarian camouflage into the President's inner sanctum.

4. The theme of the customary speech which I addressed to President Bakr before handing over my Letters of Credence, and of which the text is enclosed, was inevitably circumscribed. I expressed the hope that the improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations achieved since diplomatic relations were restored in May 1968 during my predecessor's tenure of office might be progressively consolidated in the interests of both countries, cited with gratification the encouraging state of Anglo-Iraqi trade and the recent reopening of British Council activities, and recorded my sincere desire, as one who had spent almost the whole of his

/working

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working life in the Arab world, to contribute to a closer relationship between my country and his and to the dispelling of unnecessary misunderstandings. In his reply President Bakr conceded in these fields little more than the minimum gestures required by courtesy; and by his repeated references to the wounds received by the "Arab homeland" (Palestine) in the past half century clearly intended to convey the impression that this was the area of his dominant preoccupation and the touchstone by which the performance of Her Majesty's Government would be judged.

5. Having shaken hands (after a reminder) with my staff, who then withdrew, His Excellency settled himself behind his desk with a solitary cup of coffee and cigarette for the customary private conversation. I had plenty of time during the silent photographic interlude which preceded it to wonder what hidden qualities had enabled this impressively undistinguished figure with his hooded, not to say haunted, eyes to acquire and maintain - for quite some time and virtually unchallenged - the headship of this fractious republic: not a man, it seemed, round whom a personality cult could easily be manufactured.

6. As if sensing my thoughts, the President opened the conversation (which, being in his own language, enabled him to relax a little and to vouchsafe an occasional wan smile) by warning me off the misconception common, he said, in countries like Britain that the Arabs - himself amongst them - were not "men of their word", that

/they

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they talked but did not act. The Arabs, with the help of those who befriended them and whatever the attitude of those who did not, would pursue their national interests with determination. They were, he repeated, men of their word. Ostensibly changing the subject he declared that Iraq's long experience of Britain, though not without positive aspects, was impaired by a deep and continuing Arab grievance, periodically exacerbated by the tendentious British press whose behaviour, notably at the time of the hanging of Iraqi spies, had aroused especial resentment. Asking if I might take him up on three points, I suggested, firstly, that it was a common Arab misconception that we in the West were indifferent, if not even opposed, to Arab progress and prosperity. The reverse was the truth: the prosperity of the Arab world was as emphatically in our interest as it was in theirs. Secondly, whatever the rights or wrongs of Britain's policy a generation or more ago towards the Arabs, not least towards the Arabs of Palestine, we were now sincerely striving to convince the Arab world of our good will and, in the specific context of Palestine, to promote an acceptable settlement. Hence, for instance, our initiative with Resolution 242. Thirdly, since he had mentioned the British press (which as he knew, was not subject to Government control), might I say how distressed I had been since my arrival to observe how Iraqi newspapers constantly presented world news, sometimes by omission

/and

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and sometimes by the slant given, in a manner unfavourable to my country and by contrast favourable to the Communist bloc. The latter were no doubt entitled to recognition by Iraq for the generous trade and aid policies they were now pursuing; but I wondered whether such politically motivated generosity would at the end of the day prove in the interests of the receiving country.

7. The President having indicated that this last subject was not on the agenda, I asked him what positive steps he would like to see taken by Her Majesty's Government to promote the improvement in relations for which we had both expressed our hopes. He at once mentioned the outstanding dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company, declaring that the Company was clearly unconcerned to reach a settlement: and so apparently were the British Government. This enabled me to observe that, at the Company's initiative, communications had just been exchanged with the Iraqi Government about the timing of renewed negotiations. The shareholders were anxious to send out a high level team and were concerned that Iraq should be represented at the necessary high level too. (The President stared vacantly ahead.) As for Her Majesty's Government, though they naturally maintained close contact with the two British shareholding companies out of the five and were certainly anxious that a settlement should be reached, their view was that the dispute was fundamentally a commercial issue. Not only could Her Majesty's Government not

/lay

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10. down the law but, even if this had been possible, he already knew my view that the subjection of commercial issues to political diktat, as practised by some other rich countries in their dealings with smaller States, would not in the long run prove in the latter's best interest.

8. The President then turned once more to the Palestine question. As long as arms were supplied to Israel (thus preventing the Arabs from regaining their homeland) there could be no Arab friendship for the suppliers. To divert the conversation from what promised to be an uncomfortable line, I took him up on the parenthesis rather than the main part of his sentence. He would, I said, be aware that all four Big Powers (Russia included) had recently made plain that the existence of Israel as a State had to be accepted. The territories occupied by Israel in 1967 were another matter; and Britain, as he would have been reminded by recent ministerial statements, was urgently seeking to promote the solution of this problem.

9. Half an hour of this conversation having by now elapsed, and after something approaching pleasantries had been finally exchanged, I withdrew. The cortège returned to my house, where the two extremely friendly Iraqi Protocol officers shared with my senior staff and their wives a toast to the continued improvement of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

10. Though there are doubtless many in Iraq who would subscribe to such a toast, it seems improbable that a régime headed by President Bakr will go far to make possible its realisation. The prospects, however, of a further forcible change of

/Government

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Government in Iraq in the near future seem unusually small; nor is there any guarantee at all that such a change, were one to take place, would not land us all with something even worse. I can therefore only recommend, Sir, that Britain's policy towards Iraq should be based on the assumption that the present régime is here to stay, and that we should make the best of a bad job.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Kuwait, Tehran and Washington and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have the honour to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,

*W. B. Bagin*

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### Presentation of Letters

Mr. President,

It is now nearly 18 months since relations were restored, after an unhappy interval, between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Iraq. I believe it is true to say that during my distinguished predecessor's tenure of office, despite occasional setbacks, positive progress was made in repairing the damaged links between our two countries. No doubt differences of opinion continue to exist: indeed such differences of opinion exist the world over between the friendliest countries. What is surely essential is that such differences should not arise from mere misunderstandings and misconceptions or from inaccurate information on either side. I, for my part, will do my utmost to ensure that unnecessary misunderstandings do not arise and to contribute as best I may to the resolution of such genuine intergovernmental differences as are perhaps inescapable between two nations in an imperfect world.

For myself, it is a matter of especial pleasure and pride that it has fallen to me to take up this task where my predecessor left it. Almost the whole of my working life has been spent in the Arab world; and I hope I may claim to have acquired, during the thirty years concerned,

/some understanding





some understanding of the problems of the Arab world and a readiness to respect and admire the endeavours and achievements of many Arab countries during this period. Iraq itself is new to me, but this only adds a further dimension of interest to the prospect of serving in your country.

There are many fields, Mr. President, in which I believe our national interests coincide. Our trade relations are encouraging. There is certainly no lack of interest on the part of my country's business community in promoting increased exchanges: as proof of this a high-level delegation from the Committee for Middle East Trade will, I hope, shortly be visiting Baghdad. I hope it is also true to say that the quality of British workmanship, the achievements of British technology and the efficiency and honest dealing of British business houses are no less respected and welcome in Iraq today than they have always been. May they contribute in increasing the development of Iraq along the path of economic progress to which your government has dedicated itself.

In the cultural sphere, I am particularly glad that the British Council is now once more active here, and I hope it will again play a valuable part in the development of cultural relations between our two countries. As for Iraq's own cultural achievements, I have observed

(particularly during





(particularly during the year I have just spent in Oxford University) that these are by no means unrecognised in Britain, and not least in the fields of art and literature.

But in the more sensitive field of political and intergovernmental relations it would be foolish to suggest that further improvement is not desirable: equally wrong to suggest that such improvement is not possible, given determination and goodwill on both sides. We must now consolidate, in the interest of both our countries, the relations developed since May 1968 and strive to place them on a solid and lasting basis of understanding and of mutual respect and equality.

With this purpose in view, and in the hope that Your Excellency and your Ministers will regard me as always at your disposal in its furtherance, it is my privilege to transmit the Letters which Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II had addressed to Your Excellency, accrediting me as Her Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Baghdad and announcing the recall of my predecessor, and at the same time to extend to Your Excellency the good wishes of Her Majesty and of Her Majesty's Government for your health and happiness and for the prosperity of the people of Iraq.



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W 134

Reference
REGISTRY No. 10
17 OCT 1969
NE 3/548/1

Mr. Acland

Mr. Balfour Paul's Despatch

Presentation of Credentials

An interesting despatch, the major part of which summarises a conversation between H.M. Ambassador and President Al Bakr following the presentation of credentials.

2. I agree with H.M. Ambassador's conclusions that the present regime in Iraq is here to stay and all that we can do is to make the most of a bad job.

3. I recommend that the despatch be printed (not priority) for FCO and Whitehall distribution. I have prepared a copy for the printers. There is a spare copy which Mr. Tripp and Mr. Arthur may wish to see.

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)

14 October 1969

I agree. I do not think it necessary to submit it with comments.

Oil Dept. may care to see in advance of printing.

*P.R.M. Hinchcliffe*  
14  
a

*M. Wallis*  
*Oil Dept.*

*M. Cliffjorth*

*16*  
*10*

Para. 7 leaves one wondering what way the President will jump on the oil question.

*P. G. Wallis*

*Pa P.M.H. 21/10*

*15/10*

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**NEQ 3/548/1** *Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Whitehall Distribution*

**IRAQ**

**10 October, 1969**

**Section 1**

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**PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS**

*Mr. Balfour Paul to Mr. Stewart. (Received 10 October)*

**SUMMARY**

After some delay, which was probably not intended as a deliberate affront, the Ambassador presented his credentials to the President of Iraq on the 29th of September. Description of the ceremony. (Paragraphs 1-3.)

2. In his speech the Ambassador expressed the hope that the improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations achieved since diplomatic ties were resumed might be consolidated. The President's reply conceded little more than the minimum required by courtesy. (Paragraph 4.)

3. In the private interview which followed, the President spoke about Palestine and Iraq's dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company. (Paragraphs 5-8.)

4. It seems improbable that a régime headed by President Bakr will go far to make possible an improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations. Since the prospects of a change of government seem small and there is no guarantee that any change would not be for the worse, Britain's policy should be based on the assumption that the present régime is here to stay and that we should make the best of a bad job. (Paragraphs 9-10.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

*Baghdad,*

*30 September, 1969.*

As reported in my telegram No. 851 of the 29th of September, I yesterday, after waiting some three and a half weeks, presented to the President of the Iraqi Republic the Letters accrediting me as Her Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Baghdad.

2. Despite some mild speculation in the diplomatic corps and the British community about the reason for the President's delay in receiving me, I doubt whether there was any deliberate affront intended. A delay of up to three weeks is not unusual under the present régime; President Bakr has been suffering from diabetes and other rumoured

complaints; the Foreign Minister is, and has been since my arrival, in almost perpetual motion; and the detectable air of fatigue enveloping the Government apparatus (not wholly attributable to the effects of summer) may have played a part. On the other hand, the staging of my reception in the cramped ambience of the President's private office, the unexpected absence of the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs and his replacement by an ageing cipher entitled the Inspector-General, and the lack of warmth in the President's general demeanour (markedly different from that adopted by General Ammash when he received me a fortnight ago) were not particularly reassuring.

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3. In other external respects, however, the ceremony was conducted with full courtesy. The principal Protocol Officer at the Palace and the Master of Ceremonies called at my house with the Presidential Rolls Royce, Bentley and outriders, to convey myself and the four senior members of my staff past a guard of honour into the imposing pre-revolutionary seat of Government, where I was soon conducted through a posse of soldiers in Bulgarian camouflage into the President's inner sanctum.

4. The theme of the customary speech which I addressed to President Bakr before handing over my Letters of Credence, and of which the text is enclosed,<sup>(1)</sup> was inevitably circumscribed. I expressed the hope that the improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations achieved since diplomatic relations were restored in May 1968 during my predecessor's tenure of office might be progressively consolidated in the interests of both countries, cited with gratification the encouraging state of Anglo-Iraqi trade and the recent reopening of British Council activities, and recorded my sincere desire, as one who had spent almost the whole of his working life in the Arab world, to contribute to a closer relationship between my country and his and to the dispelling of unnecessary misunderstandings. In his reply President Bakr conceded in these fields little more than the minimum gestures required by courtesy; and by his repeated references to the wounds received by the "Arab homeland" (Palestine) in the past half century clearly intended to convey the impression that this was the area of his dominant preoccupation and the touchstone by which the performance of Her Majesty's Government would be judged.

5. Having shaken hands (after a reminder) with my staff, who then withdrew, His Excellency settled himself behind his desk with a solitary cup of coffee and cigarette for the customary private conversation. I had plenty of time during the silent photographic interlude which preceded it to wonder what hidden

qualities had enabled this impressively undistinguished figure with his hooded, no, to say haunted, eyes to acquire and maintain—for quite some time and virtually unchallenged—the headship of this fractious republic: not a man, it seemed, round whom a personality cult could easily be manufactured.

6. As if sensing my thoughts, the President opened the conversation (which, being in his own language, enabled him to relax a little and to vouchsafe an occasional wan smile) by warning me off the misconception common, he said, in countries like Britain that the Arabs—himself amongst them—were not "men of their word", that they talked but did not act. The Arabs, with the help of those who befriended them and whatever the attitude of those who did not, would pursue their national interests with determination. They were, he repeated, men of their word. Ostensibly changing the subject he declared that Iraq's long experience of Britain, though not without positive aspects, was impaired by a deep and continuing Arab grievance, periodically exacerbated by the tendentious British Press whose behaviour, notably at the time of the hanging of Iraqi spies, had aroused especial resentment. Asking if I might take him up on three points, I suggested, firstly, that it was a common Arab misconception that we in the West were indifferent, if not even opposed, to Arab progress and prosperity. The reverse was the truth: the prosperity of the Arab world was as emphatically in our interest as it was in theirs. Secondly, whatever the rights or wrongs of Britain's policy a generation or more ago towards the Arabs, not least towards the Arabs of Palestine, we were now sincerely striving to convince the Arab world of our good will and, in the specific context of Palestine, to promote an acceptable settlement. Hence, for instance, our initiative with Resolution 242. Thirdly, since he had mentioned the British Press (which as he knew, was not subject to Government control), might I say how distressed I had been since my arrival to observe how Iraqi newspapers

(<sup>1</sup>) Not printed.



constantly presented world news, sometimes by omission and sometimes by the slant given, in a manner unfavourable to my country and by contrast favourable to the Communist *bloc*. The latter were no doubt entitled to recognition by Iraq for the generous trade and aid policies they were now pursuing; but I wondered whether such politically motivated generosity would at the end of the day prove in the interests of the receiving country.

7. The President having indicated that this last subject was not on the agenda, I asked him what positive steps he would like to see taken by Her Majesty's Government to promote the improvement in relations for which we had both expressed our hopes. He at once mentioned the outstanding dispute with the Iraq Petroleum Company, declaring that the Company was clearly unconcerned to reach a settlement: and so apparently were the British Government. This enabled me to observe that, at the Company's initiative, communications had just been exchanged with the Iraqi Government about the timing of renewed negotiations. The shareholders were anxious to send out a high level team and were concerned that Iraq should be represented at the necessary high level too. (The President stared vacantly ahead.) As for Her Majesty's Government, though they naturally maintained close contact with the two British shareholding companies out of the five and were certainly anxious that a settlement should be reached, their view was that the dispute was fundamentally a commercial issue. Not only could Her Majesty's Government not lay down the law but, even if this had been possible, he already knew my view that subjection of commercial issues to political diktat, as practised by some other rich countries in their dealings with smaller States, would not in the long run prove in the latter's best interest.

8. The President then turned once more to the Palestine question. As long as arms were supplied to Israel (thus preventing the

Arabs from regaining their homeland) there could be no Arab friendship for the suppliers. To divert the conversation from what promised to be an uncomfortable line, I took him up on the parenthesis rather than the main part of his sentence. He would, I said, be aware that all four Big Powers (Russia included) had recently made plain that the existence of Israel as a State had to be accepted. The territories occupied by Israel in 1967 were another matter; and Britain, as he would have been reminded by recent Ministerial statements, was urgently seeking to promote the solution of this problem.

9. Half an hour of this conversation having by now elapsed, and after something approaching pleasantries had been finally exchanged, I withdrew. The cortège returned to my house, where the two extremely friendly Iraqi Protocol officers shared with my senior staff and their wives a toast to the continued improvement of Anglo-Iraqi relations.

10. Though there are doubtless many in Iraq who would subscribe to such a toast, it seems improbable that a régime headed by President Bakr will go far to make possible its realisation. The prospects, however, of a further forcible change of Government in Iraq in the near future seem unusually small; nor is there any guarantee at all that such a change, were one to take place, would not land us all with something even worse. I can therefore only recommend, Sir, that Britain's policy towards Iraq should be based on the assumption that the present régime is here to stay, and that we should make the best of a bad job.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Jedda, Kuwait, Tehran and Washington and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

H. G. BALFOUR PAUL.



copy to each

NEQ 3/548/1

Mr. Hinchcliffe  
Mr. Mallaby

P.a. on Anglo-Iranian  
Matters File

(135)

Tech Oil Dept  
that they seem ok.

AMA 14/11

Iraq and IPC

We have been giving further thought to the form and content of any protests made to the Soviet and Iraqi Governments about the Agreement of this summer between those two Governments on exploiting expropriated parts of the IPC's concession.

...

2. We have accordingly correlated our own ideas, and comment from H.M. Embassy in Moscow in the attached draft minute to Mr. Oxley and a draft letter from him to the IPC's Legal Adviser. The suggestions are also worked out in the latest revised version of the Notes in question.

3. I should be most grateful if you could look these over finally, with a view to our clearing them both with Mr. Oxley and with the other parent Governments of the IPC (the American, French and Dutch Governments). As we see it, we have taken into account fully the view of H.M. Embassy in Moscow in altering the phrase to which they took so much objection. But we should be grateful for confirmation from EESD that there is no need for us to go back to the Embassy again for final concurrence in the drafts.

(C.T. Brant)  
Oil Department  
14 November, 1969

Mr Acland

I hope, if you see no objection, to  
inform the Oil Department that we have no  
further comments on these drafts.



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Registry No. ML

DRAFT

~~XXXXXX~~  
Blue Minute

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~Top Secret.~~  
~~Secret.~~  
Confidential.  
~~Restricted.~~  
Unclassified.

To:—

Mr. Oxley

From

C. I. Brown

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

in Sept.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Iraq and the IPC

Thank you for your observations of 6 November on the draft Notes to the Iraqi and Soviet Governments about their agreement on Iraqi oil.

2. In reply to the points which you made:—

(a) Mr. Mallaby agrees, ~~subject to a sight of the next draft version of the~~ Notes, to the procedure suggested by Mr. Ellingworth for disposing of the second Note to the Soviet Government (your para. 2).

(b) We judge it very possible that we should need to make representations to a third State if the Soviet-Iraqi co-operation went ahead, and "stolen oil" began to appear in markets elsewhere (your para. 3). We therefore deem it highly advisable for the formula about upholding rights to be retained in the Note to the Soviet Government. As regards "all available means", we should prefer some qualification of upholding /the

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the rights of the British companies:  
otherwise the determination seems somehow  
a little lame. I suggest adding "by  
such means as they see fit". If  
the Soviet Government question us as to  
the meaning of this phrase, we could, I  
suggest, intimate that consideration  
could be given to joint action by IPC  
and H.M. Government in ~~these~~ countries  
to prevent the sale of oil from the  
expropriated Iraqi fields. Since we  
are at present in the process of con-  
cluding in Whitehall\* that Soviet  
energy policy will in future be directed  
towards keeping up sales of oil in  
W. Europe for the hard currency earn-  
ings this would ~~bring~~ in, the threat  
is not entirely an empty one: ~~that~~  
is precisely in W. Europe that we could  
hope that legal measures by the IPC  
would have some effect.

provided that  
"Soviet" Iraqi oil  
could be identified  
as such.

3. It would perhaps save time if we were to  
inform Mr. Proudfoot <sup>of the changes</sup> (your paragraph 4), ~~since~~  
<sup>since he is in the office</sup>  
Mr. Dalley <sup>is</sup> at present away for two weeks or  
so, and the Company will presumably refer any amended  
version of the Notes to him anyway. I attach a  
draft <sup>letter to him</sup> accordingly, together with fresh drafts of  
the Notes in question. ...

4. As regards the Hungarian agreement <sup>aspect</sup> (your  
para. 5), the ~~Cooperation~~ <sup>deal</sup> in question is ~~also a~~  
~~State concern, and the same considerations apply~~  
~~in our view, as to the Machineexport deal. Since~~  
<sup>only for the supply of drilling equipment to the</sup>  
<sup>Iraqi national oil company (Byghat No. 894)</sup>

-/273.

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\*In the Interdepartmental Oil Policy review, now being  
chaired by the Ministry of Technology.



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In this matter I would infer that the responsibility for use of the equipment would rest with the INOC; and that therefore the question of a protest to the Hungarians would not arise. It would, however, be helpful to have the IPC's confirmation that they agree with this assessment from a legal point of view. The point is therefore included in the letter to Mr. Proudfoot.

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Registry  
No. ML 359/1

DRAFT

Letter

Type 1 +

## SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

R.J. Proudfoot, Esq.,  
Bischoff and Co.,  
City Wall House,  
79-83 Chiswell St., E.C.1

From

HL. M. Oxley  
Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Legal

## PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

IPC-Iraq Agreement

-/265

We were very grateful for your letter of 13 October (Reference E) confirming your agreement to the draft texts of Notes for presentation to the Iraqi and Soviet Governments.

2. On further consideration here, and <sup>in</sup>by our Embassy in Moscow, we have some further amendments to propose which would, we think, tighten up our arguments and improve procedure generally. The purpose of this letter is to ask if you would be good enough to consider these and let me know whether you could agree with the amendments.

3. The most significant would be to eliminate the second Note to the Russians, <sup>concerning</sup>~~about~~ Machinoexport, and to cover our interest in that Company by making reference to it in the main Note. As we see it, the procedure of addressing two Notes to the Russians is not only somewhat cumbersome, but it may also give the impression that the main thrust of our complaint is directed against the Russians. We would instead suggest the insertion of a new sentence at the end of para. 2 of the first Note for the Russians, to read

"Similar considerations apply to the recent  
/Agreement

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Agreement between the Soviet Union State Trading Organisation Machinoexport on the one hand and the Iraq National Oil Company, an Iraq state concern, on the other."

4. Secondly, we note on ~~receiving~~ the drafts, that the proposed Note to the Iraqis makes no mention of H.M. Government upholding the British Companies' rights. We think that it would be anomalous for this to be omitted, since it would be ~~most likely~~ against the Iraqis or their trade partners in 3rd countries that legal action would <sup>not likely</sup> be taken in respect of oil obtained from the expropriated areas. We have accordingly added a phrase to this effect to the last para. of the Note.

5. Thirdly, we have ~~had~~ doubts about the advisability of threatening the Soviet Government ~~that we might~~ <sup>with the</sup> use of "all available means" of action against them. We ~~are advised~~ <sup>think</sup> that this phrase might be counter-productive, without being effective. We have accordingly substituted a less precise phrase which yet reserves our freedom of action.

6. Copies of the Note so amended are enclosed: I ... hope that these proposed changes will raise no difficulty for you. As regards ~~the~~ <sup>the question of</sup> presentation, I understand that the IPC is at present seeking to pick a suitable moment for the opening of negotiations with the Iraqi authorities, and that in the absence of any further developments in this respect, the Company

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is still unwilling for these communications to be made to the two Governments.

7. Finally, we have received a report of an agreement concluded between the Iraqi National Oil Company and the Hungarian National Oil and Gas Corporation signed on 21 October. We understand that according to IPC sources, (and contrary to the ~~report~~ of the Iraqi News Agency), this agreement provides for nothing more than the supply of drilling equipment for the Iraqi National Oil Company. We conclude, therefore, that there is no need for us to consider a protest to the Hungarians. We should, however, be glad to know that this conclusion accords with your own *the Company's* interpretation of the deal.



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(112281) D.J. 301599 1.500M 2/69 Hw.

Registry  
No.

DRAFT

NOTE

Type 1 +

(258)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
X Confidential. X  
Restricted.  
Unclassified.

To:—

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad present their compliments etc., and, on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, have the honour to refer to recent agreements reached between the Government of Iraq and the Government of the Soviet Union and between the Iraq National Oil Company and the Soviet State Trading Organisation, Machinexport. These agreements appear to provide for the exploitation of oil resources in various areas of Iraq, including the proven field at North Rumaila. The right to exploit oil resources in the areas included in those agreements had, however, already been granted to British Companies by the Government of Iraq under concession agreements made by it with the Iraq Petroleum Company and the latter's Associated Companies, Mosul Petroleum Company and Basra Petroleum Company (all of which are incorporated in the United Kingdom).

Following the promulgation of Law Number 80 of 1961 the Embassy, in a note dated 3.1.76<sup>1962</sup> pointed out to the Ministry that the concession agreements then subsisting (and which still subsist) between the Government of Iraq and the three Companies obliged the parties to have recourse to arbitration in the event of any disagreement, unless the parties agreed to settle it in another way. At that time, the British Government expressed the hope that the Government of Iraq would accept the arbitration proposal shortly afterwards made by the Companies and would appoint its arbitrator.

It is also recalled that, following the promulgation of Law Number 11 of 1964 establishing the Iraq National Company, the

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Embassy, in a note dated *23 February 1964* stated that, whilst it was for the Government of Iraq to decide whether or not to establish a National Oil Company and Her Majesty's Government were not to be understood as questioning in any way the principle of the sovereignty of the State of Iraq over its natural resources, the exercise of this sovereignty was subject to the applicable principles of International Law, as was emphasised in Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14 December 1962, for which Iraq herself voted. The Embassy also pointed out that the terms of both Law Number 11 of 1964 and Law Number 80 of 1961 constituted violations of the above Companies' rights under their conventions and agreements, and reserved fully the rights of the British Government and of the Companies in respect of any breach of the rights of the Companies under their conventions and agreements arising from this legislation ~~and any~~ measures taken by the Government of Iraq in pursuance thereof.

It is further recalled that, following the promulgation of Law Number 97 of 1967, allocating to the Iraq National Oil Company the territories covered by the concessions agreements between the Iraq Government and the Companies, the Royal Swedish Embassy in Baghdad ~~in a Note dated~~ *presented* ~~in a Note dated~~ *11 September* presented to the Ministry on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, a number of observations. The British Government reminded the Iraq Government that the Companies' rights could only be altered lawfully by agreement between the companies and the Government of Iraq and not by the Government of Iraq unilaterally. The Note averred that the implementation of Law Number 97 would violate further the rights of the Companies and would, in all circumstances, conflict with established principles of International Law. The British Government accordingly protested against the enactment and any implementation of this Law. The Note presented

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by the Royal Swedish Embassy also supported the Companies' request that the issues arising out of the legislation referred to above, including Law Number 97 of 1967, should be referred to arbitration and expressed the hope that the Government of Iraq would fulfil its obligations in this respect. At the same time, the Note reserved all the rights of Her Majesty's Government and of the Companies in respect of <sup>any breaches of</sup> the rights of the Companies acquired under their conventions and agreements.

The British Embassy wish to remind the Government of Iraq that, contrary to the hope of Her Majesty's Government and to the clear intention of the Companies' concessions and agreements, the Government of Iraq has still failed to respond to these repeated requests for arbitration. The Companies on the other hand have made sincere and sustained efforts to reach a settlement by negotiation, culminating in a draft agreement between the Government of Iraq, the companies and certain other parties in 1965, which was not, however, ratified by the Iraq Government.

The conclusion of the recent agreements referred to in the first paragraph of this Note constitutes, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a yet further infringement of the rights of the British Companies since those agreements are incompatible with the concessions previously granted to those Companies. Her Majesty's Government protest against this further manifestation of the Iraq Government's disregard of the British Companies' rights notwithstanding that the Companies have shown willingness to negotiate changes in their agreements for the benefit of Iraq. Her Majesty's

Government reserve their right to uphold the rights of the British Companies in ~~all circumstances~~, such means as they see fit.

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Registry  
No.

DRAFT

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NOTE

Type 1 +

(257)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.  
Secret.

X Confidential. X

Restricted.

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

.....In Confidence

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

To:—

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Moscow present their compliments etc. and, on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, have the honour to refer to the recent agreement reached between the Government of Iraq on the one hand, and the Government of the Soviet Union on the other, for the exploitation of oil resources in Iraq.

The aforementioned agreement appears to provide for the exploitation of oil resources in various areas of Iraq, including the proven field of North Rumaila. The right to exploit oil resources in the areas included in that agreement had however been granted to the British companies by the Government of Iraq under agreements made by it with the British companies in question, namely the Iraq Petroleum Company and the latter's Associated Companies, Mosul Petroleum Company and Basrah Petroleum Company, all of which are incorporated in the United Kingdom. These agreements solemnly concluded by the Iraqi Government are in the opinion of the British Government legally binding on the parties and cannot be altered except by agreement between them. No changes have been agreed between the Parties which would allow the Government of Iraq, or any third party, to exploit the areas covered by the concession agreements and any claim by the Iraq Government that they are free to exploit these areas is invalid in international law. Accordingly Her Majesty's Government have felt obliged to give to the Government of the Soviet Union notice that the agreement referred to in paragraph 1 of this Note appears to them to

Similar considerations apply to the recent agreement between the Soviet Union's State Trading organisation Machinexport on the one hand and the Iraq National Oil Company, an Iraq State concern, on the other.

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infringe the rights of the British Companies mentioned above and that Her Majesty's Government reserve their right to up-hold the rights of the British Companies ~~by all available means~~ by such means as they see fit

Her Majesty's Government have several times drawn their views on this matter to the attention of the Iraq Government and they have presented to that Government a further Note reminding the Government of Iraq of the rights of the Companies and of the position of Her Majesty's Government. A copy of this further Note is attached for the information of the Soviet Government.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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1968/9.

NEQ 1/1

NEQ 1/2.

NEQ 1/4

NEQ 3/548/1

NEQ 3/324/1

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
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


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
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